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Abstract
As high-performance computing (HPC) continues to progress, constraints on HPC system design forces
the handling of errors to higher levels in the software stack. Of the types of errors facing HPC, soft
errors that silently corrupt system or application state are among the most severe. The behavior of HPC
applications in the presence of soft errors is critical to gain insight for effective utilization of HPC systems.
The need to understand this behavior can be used in developing algorithm-based error detection guided by
application characteristics from fault injection and error propagation studies. Furthermore, the realization
that applications are tolerant to small errors allows optimizations such as lossy compression on high-cost
data transfers. Lossy compression adds small user controllable amounts of error when compressing data, to
reduce data size before expensive data transfers saving time. This dissertation investigates and improves the
resiliency of HPC applications to soft errors, and explores lossy compression as a new form of optimization
for expensive, time-consuming data transfers.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
High-performance computing (HPC) has become a fundamental tool of science and discovery for many fields
of science and industry. HPC resources allow for solving previously intractable computational problems. In
doing so, HPC has cemented itself as the tool of scientific advancement for the twenty-first century.
HPC centers seek to optimize their impact on science by maintaining fast and efficient machines with
high availability. HPC systems are composed of physical components that have a finite lifetime and are
susceptible to environmental conditions. Current flagship HPC systems are composed of thousands of nodes
each composed of many processing cores and memory modules. As new HPC systems grow ever larger
and more powerful, design constraints such as cost and power consumption limits the reliability of future
systems [96, 13, 98]. Decreasing the mean time between failure (MTBF), which can range from 4–8 hours [75,
95], forces the handling/consideration of errors to higher levels in the software stack. Mitigating the impact
of errors on HPC applications is critical for efficient utilization of future machines.
1.1 Classification of Errors
This dissertation uses the definitions of fault, error, and failure from [5]:
Fault: hypothesized cause for an error;
Error: part of the system/application state that may lead to a subsequent failure; and
Failure: an event that occurs when an operation’s result deviates from the intended result.
Figure 1.1 shows a logical flow of how a fault occurring in the system/application transitions to a failure.
Once a fault has been activated, error is present in the system/application. Over time this error is masked
by the system/application, or propagates corrupting more of the system/application state. If the error
is not masked, a failure can occur. Failure detection is essential to ensuring usability and reliability for
systems/applications. Moreover, if errors are detected before they cause a noticeable failure, then recovery
time may be reduced.
Faults that occur in systems/applications come in two forms: permanent and transient [5]. Permanent
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Fault Error FailureActivation Propagation
Figure 1.1: Logical flow of error propagation from initial fault to subsequent failure.
faults produce systematic and repeatable hard errors that are reproducible on retry or re-execution — e.g.
inability to communicate with an oﬄine node, an input file is not found, etc. Transient faults are not
systematically reproducible and produce soft errors — e.g. radiation induced bit-flips, a packet drops in the
network, etc.
1.1.1 Hard Errors
Hard errors are the result of permanent faults in the system. Their permanent nature allows them to
be readily detected and corrected. Commonly they are handled in the fail-stop recovery model. In the
fail-stop model, when a component fails, application progress halts due to the failed component no longer
providing its intended service. In HPC, failure of a node or inability to communicate with a node in a
parallel job is sufficient for most applications to experience a hang or a crash that results in a fail-stop
failure of the application. Without an ability to recover the execution of the application, the application
needs to be restarted from the beginning, wasting computational time and resources. The prevalent method
of recovering from fail-stop failures in HPC is checkpoint-restart.
Checkpoint-restart
HPC checkpoint-restart relies on a short detection latency to minimize wasted work and traditionally em-
ploys synchronous roll-back recovery. To minimize wasted time, work has been done to find the optimal
checkpointing period [105, 30]. System-level checkpoint-restart [58, 87, 45] offers the ability to recover from
fail-stop failures — e.g. a process/node crash — in a method transparent to the application. However,
system level checkpoints are expensive in time/memory, system dependent, and do not allow for migration
between computing systems.
At large scales, system-level globally coordinated checkpoint-restart limits application performance due
to coordination and I/O time [88]. Since most HPC applications achieve low file system bandwidth [73]
during I/O, reducing the amount of checkpoint data written to the parallel file system improves perfor-
mance. Application-based checkpointing schemes lower the amount of data in a checkpoint by allowing
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HPC applications to select the specific data to be checkpointed [107].
Current application-level checkpointing methods leverage multiple levels in the memory hierarchy to
improve time to checkpoint [11, 79]. Multi-level checkpointing schemes keep the recent, frequently-taken
checkpoints in memory and only write a subset of all checkpoints to the parallel file system. To reduce
coordination overhead, asynchronous checkpoint-restart schemes have been developed [83, 94, 42], but are
susceptible to a domino effect of rolling back to older and older checkpoints to correctly recover [7]. Message
logging [77] avoids a global restart by storing communication in in-memory checkpoints, allowing for recovery
of the failed process by replaying the logged communication.
Although application-based checkpoint-restart and asynchronous checkpoint-restart do improve perfor-
mance by reducing the volume of data that is checkpointed, eventually restart files need to be written to a
stable non-volatile medium — e.g. a parallel file system. As new HPC systems come online, they expand
the amount of main memory and increase the number of levels in the memory hierarchy, but retain the same
file system bandwidth.
Current checkpointing schemes are limited by file system bandwidth as checkpoints eventually need to
be written to the parallel file system for long term persistence and recoverability. This is exacerbated on
newer machines as increasing core counts and reliance on cheaper commodity parts cause a decrease in
the mean time between failure (MTBF) [13, 96]. Decreasing the MTBF causes an increase in the number
of checkpoints taken putting increased pressure on the parallel file system. Consequently, new machines
provide on-node burst buffers and NVRAM to cache I/O operations, thus increasing memory bandwidth
to persistent storage [69]. Techniques such as data compression [99, 51, 6, 53] offer exciting avenues for
reducing checkpoint sizes and mitigating negative effects of file system bandwidth.
Forward Recovery
To avoid the need to re-execute some portion of the computation, forward recovery seeks to create a new valid
state by leveraging application specific properties or redundancies to recover/reconstruct data belonging to a
failed process. The most well know version of forward recovery is RAID [86]. RAID allows for reconstruction
of a failed disk by leveraging redundant data or encodings stored on other disks in the array. In the context
of HPC applications that typically solve a time dependent partial differential equation (PDE) or ordinary
differential equation (ODE), fail-stop failure of a process or node results in values for a region of the domain
being missing. Missing data from the crashed processes are interpolated from non-crashed processes, or
replaced with initial values [1, 27, 54].
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1.1.2 Soft Errors
Another class of faults affecting HPC systems are transient faults that lead to soft errors. This class
of faults has received an increased interest in the resilience community due to the complexity of their
detection/recovery and their expected prevalence on future systems [23, 98].
Soft hardware errors arise from two distinct sources. The first source is through chip manufacturing where
failure arises due to manufacturing defects, component aging, and contamination with radioactive materials.
In 1978, Intel was unable to deliver chips to AT&T due to chip packaging modules being contaminated with
trace amounts of uranium [76]. In 1986, IBM faced a similar problem of contamination. IBM traced their
problem to a radioactive contaminate used to clean bottles that stored an acid needed in chip manufacturing.
Chip manufacturing companies seek to obtain material from non-contaminated sources, but it is difficult to
remove all sources radioactive contamination.
The second source is from alpha particles and neutrons from cosmic radiation from the sun, distant stars,
and supernova that is constantly bombarding Earth. A 1979 survey [108] predicted the occurrence of soft
errors at various locations and elevation. IBM later confirmed these predictions, and internally released
the first report on cosmic radiation induced soft errors in 1984 [109]. Alpha particles interact directly with
electrons in silicon based transistors, while neutrons interact via elastic or inelastic collisions. Inelastic
collisions cause the majority of silent errors as neutrons break apart into smaller particles that interact with
electrons in the transistors. Interference with electrons causes an incorrect signal to be generated or it could
be masked. The incorrect signal is a soft error that is propagated to other components and can lead to silent
data corruption (SDC) in system/application state if a failure does not occur. Eventually this can result in
corruption of the application’s output. Large scale DRAM studies show bit-flip events occur thousands of
times per day [101] with variability between DRAM manufactures [100].
Figure 1.1 shows a logical flow of how a fault occurring in the system transitions to a failure. Once a
fault as been activated, error is present in the system. During the execution of the remaining instructions
this error can be masked due to programmatic or algorithmic properties, lead to a system detectable event
such as a segmentation fault, or propagate to corrupt more of the execution state. As the detection latency
increases, the chances of error propagation also increases.
Hardware Solutions
To mitigate long latencies and to provide protection against soft errors, extra hardware can be added that
allows for efficient detection/correction of soft errors. For mission critical systems such as flight control
computers and satellites, this redundancy often takes the form of triple module redundancy (TMR) [74]. In
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TMR, results are computed by three copies of the hardware each using their own data. Results from each
of the three components are sent to a majority voter. This allows for detection of errors in the system and
not permitting them to become SDC.
Although TMR is effective on small mission critical systems, at the technique is to costly at the scale
of HPC systems. HPC systems rely on commodity components that do not provide the full protections
of TMR. Because SRAMs, DRAMs, and data-paths comprise a larger area than combinational logic for
computation, historically they have been more vulnerable to soft errors. High-end server quality DRAMs,
processor caches, and data-paths employ coding techniques — such as parity, single-error correction double-
error detection (SEC-DED) ECC, Chipkill [32], cyclic redundancy check (CRC), to detect soft errors in
stored or transmitted data. More complex hardware solutions, such as Relax [31] and SWAT [66], leverage
application properties to recover at the micro architecture level.
Because of the higher cost in terms of transistors and power to protect, processor logic utilizes weaker
protection mechanisms than used in memory technology. As feature size continues to shrink along with
supply voltage, processor logic becomes increasingly susceptible to bit upset events that lead to SDC [15, 55].
Moreover, as HPC systems are becoming more complex and are using more commodity parts that do not
provide high levels of protection in hardware, the rates of soft errors impacting applications on future
machines is expected to increase and become a daily event [23, 38].
Software Solutions
Although hardware solutions to soft errors offer short detection latencies, fully protecting HPC systems from
soft errors in hardware is prohibitively expensive. If algorithms and applications detect the occurrence of
soft errors, then it is possible to estimate the severity of the error, and if beneficial, to correct and recover.
General methods for SDC detection leverage redundancy at the process level [39, 82], redundancy at
the instruction level [25, 59, 81, 72, 84], or leverages anomalies in spatial and temporal similarities for
detection [14, 9, 10, 12]. Techniques that utilize redundancy at the instruction level use various methods —
e.g. machine-learning, fault injection experiments, probability models — to identify key instructions to
replicate and add code to detect SDC. Higher level techniques that leverage spatial and temporal similarities
use prediction techniques, such as curve-fitting or lower-order methods, to evaluate the validity of newly
calculated data values.
Algorithm based fault tolerance (ABFT) has the potential to reduce the overhead and cost for detecting
and recovering from SDC by leveraging algorithm dependent heuristics or invariants to detect and recover
from SDC [48, 28, 19, 35, 54, 46]. Because ABFT is based on properties/heuristics of the application,
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the severity of an error is accessed to determine if recovery is necessary. With the increased focus on
detecting SDC inside the application, recent work has looked at its impact on HPC applications and how
SDC propagates inside them [36, 22, 4, 65, 21].
1.1.3 Going Forward
Future HPC systems are expected to be constrained in many ways. Power consumption limits the size
and types of components in the system [57, 13]. As chips are built with smaller feature sizes run at near-
threshold voltage [34] to conserve power, the become more susceptible to soft errors [55, 15]. Figure 1.2
presents the historical trend along with estimates for current technology of the connection between feature
size and voltage scaling on the soft error rate.
Next generation systems at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory1 and Oak Ridge National Labo-
ratory2 increase the amount of system memory by 5–9x without a commensurate increase in file system
bandwidth. To improve I/O performance, systems will incorporate NVRAM. Reducing the volume of data
communicated with the parallel file system helps further alleviate I/O bottlenecks.
Figure 1.2: Smaller feature sizes and lower voltage decrease the reliability of components (larger soft er-
ror rate). The Nominal curve illustrates past and present trends while the Vscale L, Vscale M, and
Vscale H curves assume low, medium and high amounts (respectively) of voltage scaling in future deep
submicron technologies. The user-visible failure rates highlighted at 45 nm and 16 nm are calculated assum-
ing a 92% system-wide masking rate [38].
In an environment where failure is a reality, mitigation strategies must be imposed to ensure usefulness
of HPC resources. These mitigation strategies need to provide a high degree of detection for errors that
1https://asc.llnl.gov/coral-info
2https://www.olcf.ornl.gov/summit/
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cause disruption in the application’s solution or time to solution at low cost. Moreover, data compression
may be required in order to reduce the volume of data transferred since data movement is a major source
of power consumption in HPC systems.
This dissertation makes the following contributions to the field of HPC:
• an LLVM based bit-flip style fault injection tool for HPC;
• an efficient detection and recovery scheme for the algebraic multigrid linear solver;
• an LLVM based error propagation tracking tool that emulates lock-step execution;
• study of error propagation HPC applications and a discussion of localized recovery options; and
• methodology for lossy compression error tolerance selection based on a priori bounds on simulation
accuracy.
This dissertation consists of two parts. The first part concerns SDC detection and propagation, and is
divided into four chapters: Chapter 2 presents an algorithmic based detection and recovery scheme for the
linear solver algebraic multigrid; Chapter 3 investigates SDC propagation inside HPC applications, common
symptoms when soft errors occur, and the ability current detection schemes to contain error propagation;
the final two chapters, Chapter 4 and 5, present tools that are developed to aid HPC fault tolerance research.
The second part of this dissertation, Chapter 6, explores how lossy compression is used to improve HPC
checkpoint restart. Related work is presented in Chapter 7. Finally, this dissertation concludes in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 2
Soft Error Detection and Recovery
for Algebraic Multigrid
Portions of this chapter are taken from the publication “Towards a More Fault Resilent Multigrid Solver” [20]
2.1 Introduction
Many scientific applications, from modeling blood flow to electromagnetics, depend on linear algebra com-
putations on sparse matrices. These types of computations often consume a sizable percent of a high-
performance computing (HPC) resources. In particular, one crucial operation is the sparse, linear solve.
Scalability and convergence of such methods are well studied, but the study of their behavior in the presence
of hardware faults is less developed. Emerging HPC architectures are expected to experience higher levels of
faults than previous architectures and understanding the impact of fault(s) on the algorithm is an important
component in fully utilizing their resources. Consequently, resiliency techniques need to be developed and
analyzed to allow linear solvers to remain efficient and scalable on emerging HPC architectures.
Modern scientific computing relies on solving large, sparse systems of linear equations. Sophisticated
solvers are employed to take advantage of this sparsity, and as computing capabilities continue to progress
so do the demands on the linear solver. One solver that has shown to be flexible across a range of different
architectures is algebraic multigrid (AMG), due to its potential scalability, robustness, and efficiency as an
O (n) complexity method, where n is the number of degrees of freedom in the problem. The focus of this
chapter is on utilizing ABFT to improve resiliency of AMG. Understanding the level of resiliency that is
provided by AMG on emerging architectures is important for AMG and other sparse, linear solvers.
To motivate the need for silent data corruption (SDC) detection and recovery in AMG, Figure 2.1 shows
the residual history for the solution of a diffusion problem in 2D (cf. Section 2.4). In this example, a single
fault is injected into the residual calculation before restriction during the second iteration on the finest
level. This fault is a single bit-flip in the first element of the residual vector, an IEEE 754 double precision
floating-point number, on process 0 of a 16 process MPI run. The fault does not lead to a segmentation
fault or segfault, and is thus silent, but impacts the execution. Depending on which bit is flipped in this
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location, the number of extra iterations required to achieve the convergence tolerance of 1e−7 ranges from
0 (bits in the mantissa and the sign bit1) to more than double the original amount (bits in the exponent),
thus motivating the need for SDC detection and recovery.
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Figure 2.1: Impact on convergence of a single bit-flip error in a IEEE 754 double precision floating-point
element of the residual vector.
To this end, we improve and analyze the resilience of AMG in the presence of soft errors. In particular,
this chapter makes the following contributions:
• low overhead algorithmic based recovery for AMG;
• low cost SDC detectors for iterative linear solvers;
• AMG specific SDC detectors; and
• a performance model to analyze the time to solution in faulty environments.
2.2 Algebraic Multigrid
Consider the sparse matrix problem Ax = b, where A is n × n. In a parallel setting, iterative solution
techniques are preferred due to the memory and complexity requirements to solve. One such approach
is algebraic multigrid (AMG) [89], which is often used as a preconditioner for a Krylov method such as
conjugate gradient (CG) or generalized minimum residual (GMRES).
1As floating-point values increase in magnitude, flipping a sign bit causes a larger deviation in value. This can lead to extra
iterations.
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AMG constructs a hierarchy of successively coarser problems that are used to iteratively refine the error
in the solution. Figure 2.2 outlines a solve cycle of AMG, where an initial guess x0 is refined using two
compatible operations: relaxation, such as weighted Jacobi, and coarse-grid correction, which is a subspace
projection method. Relaxation is responsible for reducing high energy error, while coarse grid correction
targets algebraically smooth error, or error that is invariant to relaxation. The cycle proceeds by successively
coarsening the error equations, Ae = r, until a coarse level problem is effectively solved in a few steps of
relaxation or is efficiently processed with a direct method. Errors on coarse levels are then interpolated to
correct solutions. Figure 2.2 represents the well-known V-cycle, and is a common approach to traverse the
AMG hierarchy in parallel.
Smooth: Ax0 = b
Form:
r = b−Ax0
Restrict:
rc = Rr
Solve:
Acec = rc
Correct:
x0 = x0 + e
Interpolate:
e = Pec
Smooth: Ax1 = b
Figure 2.2: AMG V-cycle process used to solve Ax = b.
2.3 Transient Error Detection
Before presenting the SDC detectors, we first discuss our fault model and assumptions. For this study,
we assume that memories are sufficiently protected with ECC and Chipkill [32]; as such, we do not model
faults in memory. Further, we assume that faults occur during instruction execution of the solve phase of
AMG and results in a single-bit perturbation in the result register. In addition, during the solve phase, the
operators A, P , and R on each level as well as the right hand side b are never written and only read. As
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a result, these structures are not checkpointed for SDC recovery. They are susceptible to errant stores that
corrupt the matrix; however, in practice this is a very rare occurrence (<0.01% of runs). If it is required to
protect these data structures from such writes, one approach is to use the system call mprotect to force the
associated memory pages to be read-only. In the case of a write to a protected page, a segmentation fault
is raised triggering recovery. This function is used in some asynchronous checkpoint-restart approaches [83]
to exploit copy on write capabilities when scheduling pages to be checkpointed.
2.3.1 Multi-level Recovery Scheme
Faults in AMG are classified as the following: a fault
• decreases the convergence time;
• increases convergence time;
• leads to convergence to wrong solution; or
• results in an unexpected program termination (crash).
In the case of divergence due to an unexpected termination — e.g. segmentation fault — this is a clear
indication that an error has occurred. The other possible results from faults lead to silent data corruption
(SDC), but the algorithm continues to function. SDC may also lead to longer runtimes or to converging
to the wrong solution. This chapter relies on mathematical theory and heuristics of AMG to detect these
errors as discussed below.
Checkpoint-restart is the standard method to recover from failure by allowing the application to crash
and restart from a checkpoint or beginning state. This chapter utilizes this idea to recovery from detected
soft errors. By observing the traversal of the AMG hierarchy, each level is considered an implicit checkpoint
or containment domain [29], since the data for that level is computed via the previous level in the hierarchy.
Upon detection, AMG assumes the previously executed level is correct and restarts execution on the previous
level. However, if the same detector flags an error in the same location, or if the error is deemed severe, then
AMG restarts the V-cycle. The code executed by the multi-level recovery scheme is found in Algorithm 2.1.
After a fault is detected, its severity is measured. Provided the fault is minor, recovery proceeds from the
previous level in the AMG hierarchy. If a SDC is flagged in the same location again or the residual check
is triggered, then recovery rolls back to the previous explicit checkpoint and restarts the solve on the finest
level.
In order for the restart routine to successfully restart on the appropriate level, global state information
comprised of the direction, level, and iteration of the solver is logged as AMG traverses the hierarchy. The
C-language function sigsetjmp creates restart points for the level and V-cycle recovery. Recovery proceeds
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Algorithm 2.1: Multi-level Restart
1 if retry same level or residual check failed then
2 restoreFromCheckpoint
(
xk
) {in-memory, fine level}
3 restartLevel(level finest)
4 if down pass then
5 if level 6= level finest then
6 restartLevel(level − 1)
7 if iteration > 0 then
8 up pass ← TRUE
9 down pass ← FALSE
10 restartLevel(level + 1)
11 else
12 restartLevel(level finest)
13 if up pass then
14 if level 6= level coarsest then
15 restartLevel(lev + 1)
16 else
17 up pass← FALSE
18 down pass← TRUE
19 restartLevel(level − 1)
with a function call to siglongjmp. These functions, commonly used for exception handling in C, store and
restore the register state of the program at the point of the call respectively — i.e. a label and a non-local
goto. In addition, the solution vector periodically creates an in-memory checkpoint at the end of the V-cycle
to limit the amount of roll back required. These minor augmentations are designed to be generic, allowing
them to be added to any sequential or parallel AMG implementation with minimal effort.
2.3.2 Soft Error Detectors
Faults that do not lead to an unexpected termination become SDC and go unnoticed by the standard AMG
algorithm. This subsection discusses simple augmentations to AMG that allow the detection of SDC. These
augmentations vary in their overhead, applicability to other codes, coverage, and recovery cost, as detailed
below.
Residual Check
The typical stopping criterion for AMG is verifying that the relative residual is less than a given tolerance.
If SDC occurs during a V-cycle, its effect is present in the residual calculated for that V-cycle and every
V-cycle thereafter until the corruption is removed. This is illustrated in the motivating example, Figure 2.1.
Unlike other iterative linear solvers, AMG solvers do not guarantee a reduction in the residual or relative
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residual monotonically from V-cycle to V-cycle. Heuristics show that for a large class of problems, the
residual is expected to decrease nearly monotonically; therefore, this work devises a low cost SDC check
that examines the newly calculated residual and compares it to the previous residual. Due to the non-
monotonically decreasing nature of the residual, a region of plausibility for the new residual is established.
This work considers a single order-of-magnitude difference as indication of SDC; while this is subjective, it
is important to note that the detection and recovery scheme is attempting to save the solver from a total
restart (see Section 2.5). In addition, the scaling factor in the residual check can be modified depending on
the type of problem being solved to enhance its ability to detect SDC and to prevent infinite loops. This
SDC detector is not AMG specific and extends to other iterative solvers.
Energy Check
AMG does not guarantee that the residual decreases monotonically at the end of every V-cycle. However,
it does guarantee a decrease in the A-norm of the error every V-cycle. Although it is not generally possible
to measure the error directly, it is possible to use AMG’s sense of energy, termed the energetic stability, to
check for SDCs.
E = 〈Ax, x〉 − 2〈x, b〉 (2.1)
The energetic stability is valid on each level: energy at level i in the down-pass of the V-cycle is greater
than the energy calculated at level i in the down-pass in the next V-cycle. The so-called energy check helps
ensure that the results calculated on a given level are without egregious errors before execution continues to
the next level. This allows recovery to proceed by the multi-level restart algorithm shown in Algorithm 2.1.
In its current form, (2.1) is costly as it requires one sparse matrix-vector multiply (SpMV) and two
inner products. The latter is a form of synchronization and limits scalability at large core counts. On the
down-pass of a V-cycle and not on the coarsest level, the residual is formed. This operation provides us with
Ax at no cost. On the up-pass, the computation is more expensive, but by rewriting (2.1) in the following
form
E = 〈r, b〉 − 2〈x− b, b〉, (2.2)
reduces scalability issues with the inner products are lowered by issuing a single collective reduce for both
inner products.
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2.3.3 Segmentation Fault Recovery
Unlike the results of the energy or residual check, where there is a global view of the result of each check once
the operation completes, segmentation faults are local to the process on which they occur. Once a segmen-
tation fault signal has been detected by the runtime environment, the all parallel processes in application
need to be terminated. One approach to segmentation fault recovery is to elevate a local segmentation fault
to a global failure inside the application, thus allowing recovery via Algorithm 2.1. However, such a scheme
causes high overheads and increases the amount of work redone. A parallel application is considered as a
decomposition into two phases: communication and computation. AMG is composed of basic linear algebra
operations such as matrix-vector and vector operations. All of these operations have an idempotent form at
the expense of a temporary vector. For example, y ← A ∗ x produces the same result independent of the
number of times the operation is executed. Due to there idempotent nature, recovery from a segmentation
fault is straightforward: restart the operation by the use of the same C functions required for Algorithm 2.1,
but use new recovery points for the idempotent operations. The error is transient and does not manifest
itself as a segmentation fault again. If the segmentation fault occurs during a non-idempotent operation such
as communication, recovery by restart using Algorithm 2.1 is possible. Yet, important state information,
may be corrupted, for example by redundantly sending/receiving messages. Message logging is able to elim-
inate redundant messages, but still faces possible corruption in the communication library. As the results in
Section 2.4 show, segmentation faults in non-idempotent regions represent a small portion of segmentation
faults (less than 3%) for the results in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3; therefore, the extra overhead is not added
to the recovery scheme.
2.4 Experimental Results
To better analyze, the impact of soft errors on AMG, the open-source LLVM fault injector FlipIt (see
Chapter 4) injects single bit-flip errors into a random dynamic LLVM instruction during the solve phase of the
AMG solver in HYPRE2. In the following (except Section 2.4.1), 1,000 fault injection trials are preformed on
Blue Waters, a Cray supercomputer managed by the National Center for Supercomputing Applications and
supported by the National Science Foundation and the University of Illinois3. Each compute node we utilize
has 2 AMD 6276 Interlagos CPUs and 64 GM of RAM. The problem solved in all trials is a 2D Laplacian
with zero on the boundaries using 16 processes and 16, 384 unknowns per process. Because of its rapid
convergence and lightweight hierarchy, this problem highlights the overhead of our detectors and recovery
2https://computation-rnd.llnl.gov/linear_solvers/software.php
3https://bluewaters.ncsa.illinois.edu/
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scheme with more severity than a more difficult problem where the solver itself is more computationally
heavy. Moreover, due to the rapid convergence for this model problem, the numerical errors are quickly
attenuated by the solve phase. When a fault is injected it is classified by FlipIt as one of three main types:
Pointer refers to all calculations directly related to the use of pointers (loads, stores, and address calculation),
Control refers to all calculations of branching and control flow (comparisons for branches and modification
of loop control variables), Arithmetic refers to pure mathematical operations (adds, multiplies).
2.4.1 Overhead
By their nature, transient faults are infrequent events, which implies that any resiliency scheme should limit
the overhead introduced in a fault free case. To determine the practicality of the SDC detectors, it is critical
to assess both their ability to detect as well their cost (overhead). Figure 2.3 details the overhead with
respect to solve phase execution time of each SDC detector. The multi-level recovery scheme is enabled for
every configuration in which a detector is active. Since the overhead is measured during a fault free case,
the multi-level restart code is never executed; therefore, the time required to restart the AMG solve is not
reported in the timings. Furthermore, the energy check is enabled on all levels along with an in-memory
checkpoint of the solution vector at the end of every V-Cycle to test the worst case scenario for overhead.
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Segmentation Fault (Segfault) recovery and the residual check (Residual) yield a lower overhead than an
energy check (Energy). In fact, their runtimes are similar to the original code, differing by less than 1% on
average. In contrast, the energy check is more expensive. This is offset by the fact that the energy check is
more powerful, enabling detection of SDCs at each level. Performing the energy check on each level limits
the amount of work that needs to be redone. The segmentation fault recovery and the residual check have
a low combined overhead of less than 1.9% on average; therefore, these two detectors are combined to form
the Low Cost resiliency configuration. Even with all detectors enabled in a worst-case scenario, the observed
maximal overhead is less than 20%. In practice, the frequency of a checkpoint, and the location of an active
energy check would be modified to meet a strict resiliency budget.
To better characterize the overhead of the energy check, Figure 2.4 shows the percentage of level time
consumed by the energy check. Moving from the finest level (0) to the coarsest level (10) of the V-cycle the
problem size decreases, but each level becomes more dense. As the density of the level increases, the energy
check has a greater influence on level time. Although there is an increase in percentage of level time, the
energy check is cheaper on the coarsest levels than on the finest level. However, for AMG hierarchies that
have coarse levels that consume more execution time than fine levels, protecting only the coarse levels may
yield high overheads. The energy check is relatively more expensive on level 1 because although the number
of unknowns in the problem is less on level 1, the number of non-zero entries is roughly the same leading to
a denser matrix used in the check.
2.4.2 Fault Characteristics
In order to devise effective resiliency schemes, it is important to determine where faults are injected into the
AMG solve phase. As in Section 2.4.1, the worst-case scenarios for both the residual and energy check are
explored. Faults are injected randomly throughout the solve phase with each dynamic instruction having
a uniform probability of 1e−8. Seeding the fault injector differently for each trial yields injections in all
iterations of the solve.
Operation No Detectors Low Cost All
Relaxation 50.1% 47.4% 42.5%
SpMV 47.0% 49.1% 48.2%
Inner product 1.1% 1.7% 6.7%
Other 1.8% 1.8% 2.6%
Table 2.1: Percentage of injections in AMG components.
Table 2.1 highlights that most of the faults are injected into Relaxation and the SpMV routines, which
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Figure 2.5: Breakdown of faults injected into AMG components based on the type of instruction executed.
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includes A for the residual, P , and R. This is expected since most of the solve time is spent in these routines.
The classification Other comprises all other functions used during the HYPRE solve phase — e.g. cycling
code, vector copy, and scaling routines. For configurations where the energy check is enabled, there is an
increase in the frequency of injections into the inner product routine. This is a result of the energy check
requiring an inner-product.
Figure 2.5 shows what type of instruction where fault injection occurs. A significant number of faults
are injected into Pointer and Arithmetic instructions. The high degree of Pointer injections is due to using
sparse matrix data structures which uses indirection to access the data elements. A corrupted pointer often
leads to a segmentation fault, and corruption of Arithmetic computation can produce results as shown in
Figure 2.1, thus motivating the need for an efficient detection and recovery scheme.
Adding SDC detectors increases resilience, but suffers from occasionally from false positives. The com-
parisons for the residual and energy check represent a small portion of the dynamic instructions during the
solve phase and are unlikely to experience a SDC. The computation to form the quantities for the compar-
isons are more likely candidates. Regardless of where SDC occurs, a false positive in the residual or energy
check is handled as if it is a true positive.
2.4.3 Convergence Analysis
The following convergence study uses the same initial guess and right hand side to limit variability in the
results. Moreover, since an injected fault may lead to an increase in the number of iterations, the maximum
number of iterations is set at 20. This allows four more iterations to converge than the fault-free solve.
Results No Detectors Low Cost All
Converged 73.5% 98.6% 99.0%
Did not converge 1.0% 0.4% 0.0%
Crashed 25.5% 1.0% 1.0%
Table 2.2: Percentage of trials that converge with a single injection.
Table 2.2 shows that a single injection has a large impact on convergence, with 25.5% of all trials
segmentation faulting before convergence in the unmodified version of AMG. A high rate of segmentation
faults is expected since one-third of injections are into instructions classified as Pointer . In configurations
where segmentation fault recovery is enabled, the segmentation fault recovery successfully recovers allowing
the solve to continue. With the aid of the SDC detectors, 12% of injections are caught. If uncaught, these
injections lead to extra iterations.
With multiple injections, Table 2.3 shows a large deterioration in convergence for the unprotected AMG
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Results No Detectors Low Cost All
Converged 0.0% 86.2% 84.8%
Did not converge 0.0% 2.8% 0.2%
Crashed 100.0% 11.0% 15.0%
Table 2.3: Percentage of trials that converge with multiple injections. Average of 14 injections per trial for
Low Cost and All. Average of 4 injections per trial for No Detectors.
implementation with all trials crashing due to segmentation faults. However, the protected versions of AMG
remains convergent even in the presence of a high number of faults. Enabling the energy check increases
sensitivity to SDC allowing increased detection, but the check also incurs a cost. The energy check flags SDC
at a rate that is 1.5× that of the residual check, but recovering from the SDC is more expensive than letting
the AMG naturally iterate through the error. Some SDC causes a small increase in the energy from the
previous iteration that triggers the energy check, and recovery proceeds with the multi-level restart algorithm.
However, the error due to the SDC does not impact the number of iterations to converge. In addition, the
energy check also increases the parallel communication in routines where idempotent segmentation fault
recovery is not possible. Consequently, as the number of faults encountered per solve increases, the energy
check becomes less useful.
Figure 2.6, looks at how convergence is affected by the number of injections in both the Low Cost and All
configurations. In Figure 2.6, the average number of injections in each trial increases until the probability of
convergence drops below 0.5. The probability of convergence is computed by dividing the number of trials
that converge by the number of trials.
Even with an average of 37 faults injected during each trial, the resilient versions of AMG converges
in over 69% of trials for Low Cost and in over 62% of trials for All. Again the energy check is able to
detect more SDC, even those that do not significantly affect convergence, but has a lower probability of
convergence. After this point in the testing, the probability of convergence decreases dramatically. This is
because the solver is making little progress due to high amounts of recovery and because the segmentation
faults are emerging in non-idempotent routines. Indeed, 54% of trials of the Low Cost configuration and
75% of the All trials terminate due to segmentation faults in non-idempotent regions. This suggests that if
the code is restructured with more idempotent regions, convergence rates would improve. For the remaining
faults, when a SDC is detected recovery proceeds via the multi-level recovery scheme, but during the recovery
process another fault requiring another restart occurs, allowing almost no forward progress.
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Figure 2.6: Convergence of AMG with multi-level recovery scheme.
2.5 Performance Model
This section constructs a performance model in order to highlight the scalability of the approach and the
impact on computational complexity in the scheme. The performance model models the algorithmic based
detectors and multi-level recovery scheme in order to understand the impact on the convergence properties
of the AMG solver and to see the potential benefits of the methodology. Section 2.4.3 presents results from
fault injection experiments on solves of AMG with various error rates and detectors enabled.
2.5.1 Basic Model
AMG is divided into two phases: setup and solve. These phases do not overlap leading to the basic perfor-
mance model for the runtime of the solution to Ax = b:
Ttotal = Tsetup + Tsolve (2.3)
During the solve phase of AMG, there are several choices that influence the performance of the solver such
as depth of the cycle, type of cycle, smoother, etc. In response, our performance model below (see (2.4))
is designed to abstract many of these choices yielding a practical tool, while at the same time providing
enough detail to draw firm conclusions. Tcycle is the time for a single cycle (iteration) in AMG, and ncycles is
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the number of cycles until convergence. In our model, ci and ti are the number of visits to level i per cycle
and time to visit level i, respectively. Since the fault model only considers faults in the solve phase, let β
represent the percent increase in iteration count due to reduced convergence as result of a SDC. β is more
accurately modeled by Trepeat, using ri as the number of times a level is repeated due to a SDC. To account
for resiliency in the model, the term oi is added to ti to account for the overhead of the added resiliency
measures on level i. Thus, the time for the solve is modelled as
Tsolve = ncycleTcycle (1 + β)
= ncycleTcycle + Trepeat
= ncycle
(
nlevel∑
i=0
ci (ti + oi)
)
+
nlevel∑
i=0
ri (ti + oi)
(2.4)
The number of cycles (iterations) required for AMG to converge to d digits of accuracy is given by
d
− log10(ρ) , where ρ is the convergence factor, the spectral radius of the iteration matrix used during the
relaxation step. If faults occur during the solve phase, convergence potentially deteriorates to ρˆ = αρ, where
α is the factor by which the convergence such that ρ < ρˆ < 1. As convergence deteriorates, additional
cycles are required to achieve convergence to the same accuracy. In some situations, the increase is dramatic
as outlined in Figure 2.1. The proposed detection and recovery scheme limits the number of extra cycles
required by maintaining the average convergence factor of the fault free problem in most cases; if the average
convergence factor is only slightly affected, then a corresponding number of additional iterations are needed.
2.5.2 Segmentation Fault Recovery
To implement the segmentation fault recovery outlined in Section 2.3.3, calls are made to the functions
sigsetjmp and siglongjmp. These calls, along with subsequent retry of the regions after a segmentation
fault, add time not reflected in our model (2.4). Thus, the resiliency overhead is defined as
oi = Tseg, (2.5)
where Tseg is the overhead of segmentation fault recovery. Recovery from a segmentation fault restart
the local idempotent operation. This operation time is less than the level time. Our model provides an
upper bound on the restart time by defining ri as the sum of the maximum number of segmentation faults
experienced on a single rank on level i during each cycle.
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2.5.3 Residual and Energy Check
To add the residual and energy checks to our modelling of resiliency overhead in (2.6), an extension is made
to (2.5), incorporating Tcheckpoint, which is the time to checkpoint the solution vector on the fine level. In
addition, Tresidual is the overhead of the residual calculation (only on level 0), and TenergyDowni and TenergyUpi
are the overheads of doing the energy check on level i of the down and up-pass respectively. This yields
oi =

Tseg + TenergyDowni + TenergyUpi + Tcheckpoint + Tresidual i = 0
Tseg + TenergyDowni + TenergyUpi i 6= 0
(2.6)
2.5.4 Comparison of Time to Solution
Faults that occur during the solve phase that require extra iterations to converge increase the average
convergence factor. As the average convergence factor approaches 1.0, the number of iterations required
to converge grows exponentially. Ultimately, the same asymptotic convergence factor is likely achieved, yet
the effective convergence factor for the run increases. Figure 2.7, show the relative overhead is equal to
β. Each trend is associated with a different value for β, which represents the percent increase in iteration
count over the fault free case. Specifically β = 1.0 corresponds to taking twice as many iterations to
solve the problem when compared to the fault free case leading to a relative overhead of 1. The overhead
due to a SDC is proportional to the amount of duplicated work. For example, if a problem’s average
convergence factor changes from 0.2 to 0.3, this is equivalent to β = 0.3 or a 1.3× increase in the number
of iterations of the original problem. This compounds as the average convergence factor approaches 1.0,
where the number of iterations required grows exponentially. The proposed detection and recovery scheme
keeps β small which limits extra computation. Looking at the speedup of time to solution with a single
soft error occurs, Figure 2.8 shows that for problems that convergence rapidity (small convergence factors)
the overhead of resiliency impedes time to solution. However, for problems that take more iterations to
converge (large convergence factors) using the protection mechanisms of Low Cost and All improve time to
solution. Figure 2.8 assumes that the soft error causes a deterioration in the convergence factor by 10%.
The configuration Low Cost requires the recovery of the entire V-cycle (increase of 1 iteration over the fault
free case), and the configuration All requires the recovery of a single level (modeled as the most expensive
level retry).
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Figure 2.7: Relative overhead in converging to a fixed tolerance for various values of β.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Convergence Factor (ρ)
0
2
4
6
8
10
Sp
ee
du
p 
in
 T
im
e t
o 
So
lu
tio
n
No Detectors
Low Cost
All
Figure 2.8: Speedup in time to solution relative to non-protected AMG (No Detectors).
2.6 Conclusions
This chapter presents an algorithmic specific detection and recovery scheme for the algebraic multigrid linear
solver. Through the use of fault injection experiments, this chapter shows the detection and recovery scheme
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maintains a high probability of convergence with fault rates where an unprotected AMG fails to converge
at all. Finally, a performance model analyzes when the detection and recovery scheme improves time to
solution. In the next chapter, the propagation of soft errors in HPC applications and kernels is investigated.
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Chapter 3
Error Propagation
Portions of this chapter are taken from the publications “Understanding the Propagation of Error Due
to a Silent Data Corruption in a Sparse Matrix Vector Multiply” [22] and “Towards a More Complete
Understanding of SDC Propagation” [21]
3.1 Introduction
Global checkpoint-restart is the standard fault tolerance protocol used by HPC applications to recover
from fail-stop failures. The limited bandwidth of persistent storage is the main performance bottleneck
of checkpointing methods. Current versions mitigate storage bandwidth issues by leveraging the memory
hierarchy [79, 11] and use compression techniques [91].
Another way to limit the impact of storage bandwidth is to avoid the need for global checkpointing and
global restart. Checkpoint-restart schemes often coordinate checkpointing and global restart: at checkpoint
time, all processors are synchronized and the application state is saved, while at restart time, the entire
application state is restored. This results in bursts of I/O that slow down checkpoint and recovery. Various
schemes have been proposed to support uncoordinated checkpointing and localized restarts [107, 42, 43].
Similarly, application specific recovery reconstructs lost data from the remaining correct data [1].
Most recovery schemes assume that corruption is limited to a subset of values — e.g. values in the memory
of one compute node. This condition is easy to satisfy with fail-stop failures, but may not be valid in the
case of SDC detection with high latency. One solution is to verify all state outside of a corrupted subset [29].
However, such checks are expensive. An alternative is to determine the propagation of corruption when a
detection occurs and to restrict recovery to the potentially impacted state. In this case, some corruption
can be ignored as it is attenuated by the algorithm; in other scenarios, corrupted values may permanently
influence the solution.
Prior work has explored how deviations from bit-flips in floating-point computation impact on con-
vergence properties [36, 35]. Other work has used corruption propagation in the development of low-level
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instruction based detection schemes that check invariants or create SDC detectors inside the compiler [46, 84]
or utilize code replication to detect corruption in instructions that are likely lead to and propagate corrupted
state [59, 37, 56], and understanding long latency crashes [104, 64]. This chapter combines the latency of
programmatic systems of soft errors — e.g. segmentation faults, detection, control flow divergence — with
corruption propagation in state variables to discuss the impact of detection latency on recovery options. In
the context of tracking corruption propagation inside applications, [4] looks at state corruption propagation
in MPI codes by tracking number of incorrect memory addresses, but does not relate corruption back to
application level data structure nor explore compiler optimizations and the impact of local problem size
on corruption propagation. [65] quantifies corruption in different GPU and host memories in GPGPU pro-
grams. This chapter’s focus is on MPI applications and tracks corruption in state variables and across MPI
processes.
A detailed view of corruption propagation offers a measure of an application’s ability to withstand soft
errors. Moreover, it also helps application developers identify where to place detectors and to identify
locations for data recovery. This chapter makes the following contributions:
• the impact of detection latency on recovery options;
• the data structures critical to corruption and the risk of obtaining invalid results;
• the influence of compiler optimizations on state corruption propagation; and
• the analysis of problem size and inter-node corruption propagation.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 discusses corruption propagation for
sparse matrix-vector multiplication and motivates the need to investigate state corruption propagation in
application codes. Error propagation results are presented in Section 3.3 along with a discussion on detection
and recovery options.
3.2 Motivation
Sparse matrix-vector multiplies (SpMV) are at the core of many HPC applications. Mathematically a SpMV
is a series of inner-products between the rows of the matrix and the input vector. The inner-products can
be further broken down into a series of multiplications and additions. Breaking the SpMV down into its
constituent operations allows for modeling of corruption propagation.
In Figure 3.1, one element of the input vector is corrupted (red square). Walking though each inner
product the erroneous element is used in three inner products. The results of these inner-products are
potentially corrupted as shown by the red squares in the result vector. If this SpMV is used as part of
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an iterative method or solver, the corruption will propagate further as the output vector is used as the
input vector for the next SpMV. From this, it can be generalized that any corruption in element i of the
input vector propagates to element j of the output vector if row j in column i is non-zero. Thus, dense
matrices propagate corruption much faster than sparse matrices. Figure 3.2 shows the percent of loads/stores
corrupted during a SpMV. Corruption propagates faster for a matrix that is 75% sparse compared to a matrix
that is 99% sparse. The matrices are the first two levels of an AMG hierarchy for a 2D rotated anisotropic
diffusion problem. With each successive SpMV, propagation occurs though iterative method style reuse
of the previous result vector. With more iterations, masking starts to occur leading to a reduction in the
percent of loads and stores corrupted. This masking is due to convergence of iterative methods schemes. In
this case, the repeated matrix-vector multiplies causes the vector to converge to the dominant eigenvector
for the matrix.
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Figure 3.1: Propagation of SDC via a sparse matrix-vector multiply.
Understanding propagation at this level is relatively straight forward, but comes with an important
caveat. Corruption is only considered at the level of the algorithm and not how it is expressed in code
executed by a computer. To fully measure error propagation for the SpMV, the effect of corruptions of
loads, stores, address calculations, branching, looping, etc. needs to be considered. This type of analysis
is difficult to perform because it relies on a specific implementation and the manner in which the code
is executed on the machine. This motivates the need to track propagation at the execution level. The
corruption propagation tool (see Chapter 5) used in this chapter allows for tracking error propagation at the
level of application variables and with load/store granularity.
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Figure 3.2: Propagation of SDC by iterative method style reuse.
3.3 Experimental Results
To determine if propagation occurs, application source code is compiled with a tool (see Chapter 5) that
considers two levels of propagation:
macro tracks deviations in the state variables through the simulation; and
micro tracks deviations in the loads, stores, and other low-level operations.
3.3.1 Testing Methodology
System
Results are collected on Blue Waters. Version 3.5.2 of clang and LLVM compile and instrument the source
code.
Fault Injection
This chapter does not inject faults into the initialization of the applications. Instead, faults are injected
during the main computation using FlipIt (see Chapter 4). The selected applications use MPI, and in the
tests, MPI process rank 3 is selected to experience a single bit-flip error during the execution of a unique,
random dynamic LLVM instruction. Faults are injected in a single MPI process, and all MPI processes
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track propagation via the methods outlined in Chapter 5. Injected instructions are classified based on
FlipIt’s classification system (see Table 4.2) with Control-Branch and Control-Loop being combined into one
category, Control .
Each application is run 1500 times with a different random fault each time. The kernels WAXPBY1 and
SpMV are run 1500 times per optimization level each with a different random fault.
Applications
Jacobi: Jacobi performs Jacobi relaxation on a unit square with fixed boundaries is using a 5-point stencil
and 1-D row partitioning of parallel processes. This test uses 4 MPI processes with 4096 grid points per
process. Jacobi relaxation does not guarantee a reduction in the residual, however unexpected large jumps
often indicate the presence of state corruption. At the end of each iteration, a detector flags any increase
in the residual by an order of magnitude as SDC. The stopping tolerance used for Jacobi is 1e−3 and
the floating-point comparison tolerance when tracking propagation is set to 1e−5. Finally, macro-level
propagation results are logged at the end of each iteration.
CoMD: CoMD2 is a molecular dynamics mini-app created and maintained by the Exascale Co-Design
Center for Materials in Extreme Environments (ExMatEx). CoMD is parallelized with MPI and uses a
link-cell structure to determine the interaction regions for the atoms. This test uses 16 MPI processes to
simulate the motion and interaction of 32,000 atoms over 500 time-steps, where forces between atoms are
computed using the Embedded-Atom Method (EAM). SDC is detected by ensuring that the total energy is
within five standard deviations of the ensemble mean. Macro-level propagation results are logged at the end
of each iteration. Deviations smaller than 1e−10 are considered insignificant to accuracy of CoMD.
HPCCG: HPCCG3 is a conjugate gradient (CG) benchmark from the Mantevo Suite that simulates a
3D chimney domain using a 27-point finite difference matrix. This test is run with 16 MPI processes and a
local block size of nx = ny = nz = 13. As with Jacobi, the CG algorithm does not guarantee a reduction
in the residual. Here, any increase in the residual by an order of magnitude is flagged as SDC. Macro-level
propagation results are logged at the end of each iteration. The convergence tolerance used for HPCCG is
1e−7; when tracking corruption propagation, deviations smaller than 1e−10 are ignored.
1The WAXPBY kernel is defined as the scaled vector addition operation w = a ∗ x + b ∗ y.
2https://github.com/exmatex/CoMD
3https://mantevo.org/packages.php
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3.3.2 Micro-level Propagation
Latency of Detection
Each injected fault starts as a single-bit error in the result register of an instruction. As the program
executes, the single-bit error propagates to other registers and memory locations. Depending on the type of
instruction the fault is injected into, the latency-to-detection often varies. The analysis in this chapter looks
at three failure symptoms: segmentation fault, detection, and control flow divergence. Table 3.1 shows the
breakdown of each symptom based on instruction type across the tests in Section 3.3.1.
Segmentation faults occur in 30–35% of all injected faults in each application. From Table 3.1, the
majority (over 50%) of segmentation faults are triggered by Pointer instructions. Figure 3.3 shows the
segmentation fault latency for each application in number of LLVM instructions executed after an injection.
A significant number (90%) of segmentation faults occur within 4 LLVM instructions. Of the runs with
a segmentation fault within 4 LLVM instructions, 61% percent are classified as Pointer, 32% percent are
classified as Arith-Fix, 0% percent are classified as Arith-FP, and 13% percent are classified as Control.
Looking at the remaining segmentation faults, 16% percent are classified as Pointer, 8% percent are classified
as Arith-Fix, 0% percent are classified as Arith-FP, and 76% percent are classified as Control. Short latencies
are attributed to corruption of address calculation — e.g. corrupting an address or offset before a load or a
store. Longer latencies are the result of corruption in the loop induction variables. The instructions used to
check a loop conditional increase the segmentation fault latency slightly before the induction variable is used
as part of a load/store during the subsequent iteration. Segmentation fault latencies for these applications
are consistent with those reported for the Linux kernel [40] and other benchmarks [64].
Instruction Segmentation Detection Control Flow
Type Fault Divergence
Arith-FP 0% 49% 20%
Arith-Fix 24% 24% 26%
Pointer 56% 27% 16%
Control 20% 0% 38%
Table 3.1: Breakdown of failure symptom by instruction type.
Figure 3.4 shows the bit locations that generated a segmentation fault. The results highlight that most
segmentation faults occur due to a bit-flip near the most-significant bit (MSB). Bit-flips in bits near the
least-significant bit (LSB) lead to incorrect indexing and using incorrect data. Flipping bits 0–2 result in
unaligned data access for double precision arrays and can cause significant deviation in the load/store, but
rarely generates a segmentation fault. As the local problem size grows, the amount of allocated memory
also increases. As a result, the number of segmentation faults decreases for low order bits by as they are
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Figure 3.3: Latency (number of LLVM instructions) until a segmentation fault.
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Figure 3.4: Bit positions where injected fault resulted in a segmentation fault.
Segmentation faults are an excellent detector that allow little corruption propagation in most cases. Since
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segmentation faults occur in only 30–35% of the tests most faults allow for propagation and SDC. Typical
HPC SDC detectors check for errors at a coarse granularity (thousands or millions of instructions) by looking
for latent errors that have corrupted the state of application level variables to cause a noticeable deviation.
Overall the lightweight SDC detectors added to applications (Section 3.3.1) detect data corruption in 11%
of Jacobi runs, 1% of HPCCG runs, and 2% of CoMD runs. Breaking down which faults are detected by
instruction type, Table 3.1, shows most detected faults occur in Arith-FP instructions. Figure 3.5 shows the
latency in number of LLVM instructions executed before the detection occurs. Compared to detection via
segmentation faults, detection latency of specially designed detectors is much larger.
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Figure 3.5: Latency (number of LLVM instructions) until SDC detection.
Each test checks for SDC at the end of each iteration. Converting detection latency from LLVM in-
structions executed to iterations executed shows all runs with detection for CoMD within three iterations
of injection and HPCCG within one iteration of injection. Detected SDC in Jacobi has a longer maximal
latency at 595 iterations, but a median of 12 iterations. Faults that result in an order of magnitude differ-
ences in floating-point values are detected during the subsequent iteration. Without SDC detectors 100% of
HPCCG runs and 56% of Jacobi require extra iterations to converge to the correct solution. All CoMD runs
with detection appear as outliers when forming an ensemble distribution at the final time-step if no SDC
detectors are present.
If recovery from a SDC with a long detection latency uses frequent in-memory checkpoint, then a domino
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effect [7] is possible until a checkpoint is found that is free of corruption. At detection time, if the extent of
corruption is known in terms of state variables and processes, then forward-recovery schemes offer the best
solution to avoid the domino effect of checkpoint-restart (backward-recovery).
Abnormal Behavior
HPC applications commonly iterate over and compute on vectors of data. Faults in Pointer and Arith-Fix
instructions often lead to corruption in pointers used in load/store operations, and can lead to segmentation
faults. However, corruption of loop control variables can lead to divergence in the control flow graph. Control
flow divergence in loops (see Figure 3.6) results in an early loop exit; consequently, elements of a vector may
not be updated or computed. Control flow divergence occurs in 3% of Jacobi runs, 6% of HPCCG runs,
and 20% of CoMD runs. Unlike HPCCG and Jacobi where data distribution is static, CoMD has atoms
that migrate between processes that dynamically modify the data distribution. The extreme latencies for
control flow divergence in CoMD are due to corruption of the atom positions that modifies the control flow
of the atom exchange routine as atoms migrate incorrectly (inter-process corruption propagation). In the
remaining cases, most control flow diverges within the injected loop structure, leaving some vector entries
unmodified. To ensure correct execution of these loops, instruction duplication techniques such as IPAS [59]
and FlipBack [81] or low-cost invariant checks [46], offer the ability to ensure correct control flow with minor
overheads.
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Figure 3.6: Latency (number of LLVM instructions) until control flow diverges.
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An optimization to lower the overhead of algorithmic based SDC detection schemes is to assume static
data — e.g. the matrix in a linear solver, is sufficiently protected that it does not need explicit checks for
consistency. Instead, SDC detectors are placed on dynamically changing data because it is more vulnerable
to becoming corrupted. With a fault model that only allows for corruption in Arith-FP values, this is a valid
assumption, however once corruption occur in Arith-Fix and Pointer type instructions, static data can be
written by errant store instructions. Although very rare (less than 0.01% of runs) it does have the ability to
make a convergent algorithm non-convergent or converge to a different solution. To mitigate corruption of
static data, checksums can be employed to ensure consistency or pages containing static data can be marked
read-only after initialization to ensure no errant stores corrupt the data.
Effect of Compiler Optimizations
The ratios of the different instruction types impact the probability of different failure symptoms. Table 3.2
shows the percentage of dynamic LLVM instructions for each application classified as a given instruction
type. Across all applications, instructions classified as Arith-FP comprises the majority dynamic instructions
followed by instruction types Pointer and Arith-Fix that are used to compute addresses. Finally, Control
flow makes up the smallest classification percentage.
Instruction Type HPCCG Jacobi CoMD
Arith-FP 35% 41% 35%
Arith-Fix 22% 28% 16%
Pointer 22% 21% 34%
Control 21% 10% 15%
Table 3.2: Dynamic LLVM instruction type percentage.
Instruction mix depends on the data structures, compiler, and optimization level. Two key operations
in the HPCCG mini-app and other linear solvers are the sparse matrix-vector multiply (SpMV) and scaled
vector addition (WAXPBY). The impact of compiler optimizations on these small kernels helps identify the
impact on the full mini-app and production application.
WAXPBY: A WAXPBY operation, Algorithm 3.1, scales two input vectors x and y and adds them. Compiling
without any optimizations (-O0) produces verbose and explicit code as every load and store references
memory. Register allocating variables i and N along with hoisting loads outside the loop with -O1 reduces
address calculation and loads/stores that often lead to segmentation faults (see Section 3.3.2). Furthermore,
optimization levels -O2 and -O3 unroll and vectorize the loop, further reducing the need for control flow
instructions. For this kernel, -O2 and -O3 produces identical code. To support higher level optimizations
such as loop unrolling and vectorization, extra instructions are added to ensure correctness for all sizes of N.
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Table 3.4 summarizes the impact of compiler optimizations. Vectorization increases the number of integer
operations which causes an increase in runs that experience a segmentation fault. Loop unrolling removes
branching instructions and instructions that update the loop induction variable which removes locations
where corruption of loop induction variables are possible lowering control flow divergence.
Algorithm 3.1: Scaled Vector Addition (WAXPBY).
1 for i ← 0 to N do
2 w[i] ← a * x[i] + b * y[i]
Optimizations Arith-Fix Pointer Control Arith-FP
O0 31%(32772) 23%(24579) 15%(16385) 31%(32770)
O1 8%(4097) 23%(12288) 23%(12289) 46%(24576)
O2/O3 17%(5128) 40%(12291) 3%(1031) 40%(12292)
Table 3.3: Dynamic LLVM instruction percentage for WAXPBY kernel.
Symptom O0 O1 O2/O3
Segmentation Fault 29%(435) 27%(405) 40%(600)
Control Flow Divergence 10%(150) 4%(60) 2%(30)
No Symptom 61%(915) 69%(1035) 58%(870)
Table 3.4: WAXPBY kernel failure symptom percentage as a function of compiler optimization.
SpMV: The SpMV kernel, Algorithm 3.2, is more complicated than that of WAXPBY both mathematically
and in machine code. Because the SpMV uses a sparse matrix representation (compressed sparse row in
Algorithm 3.2), the level of indirection needed to access entries of the matrix increases. Each increase in
indirection involves a pointer dereference; therefore, with more address manipulations and loads/stores, the
number of dynamic instructions of Arith-Fix and Pointer are higher than with WAXPBY, as shown in Table 3.5.
This also implies that common symptoms of these types of operations will be more prevalent.
Algorithm 3.2: Sparse Matrix-Vector Multiplication.
1 for i ← 0 < num row do
2 tmp ← 0
3 for jj ← A i[i] ¡ A i[i+1] do
4 tmp ← tmp + A data[jj] * x data[A j[jj]]
5 y data[i] ← tmp
With the baseline optimization level -O0, the code is explicit and verbose. Higher levels of optimizations
retain the base addresses of the arrays A i, A j, A data in register temporaries along with loop induction
variables and hoists loads with -O1. Optimization levels -O2 and -O3 do not vectorize this kernel. Instead,
35
Optimizations Arith-Fix Pointer Control Arith-FP
O0 38%(1304455) 40%(1363261) 6%(207609) 16%(562824)
O1 22%(316414) 24%(336417) 21%(306413) 33%(464020)
O2 24%(326414) 23%(306417) 19%(257609) 34%(454816)
Table 3.5: Dynamic LLVM instruction classification percentage for SpMV kernel.
the inner most loop is unrolled removing comparisons and branching instructions along with hoisting the
load of num row to outside the loops.
Table 3.6 shows that without vectorization, the rate of segmentation faults remains around 30% of
executions, which is consistent with WAXPBY and the applications. Loop unrolling fails to reduce divergence
in control flow compared to WAXPBY. Control flow for the inner most loop is more complex than with WAXPBY
resulting in more locations in which a fault can occur that influences control flow.
Symptom O0 O1 O2/O3
Segmentation Fault 25%(375) 32%(486) 29%(436)
Control Flow Divergence 12%(180) 13%(201) 14%(207)
No Symptom 63%(945) 55%(813) 57%(857)
Table 3.6: SpMV kernel failure symptom percentage as a function of compiler optimization.
3.3.3 Macro-level Propagation
After a fault occurs, an erroneous value is present in the application state. Over time, as this value is
used/reused, the corruption propagates to infect larger portions of the application state. Most HPC SDC
detectors ensure correctness of application level variables. Knowing which application variables are corrupted
and the extent of corruption can assist in placement of detection and recovery schemes.
Jacobi
Each iteration of Jacobi refines a solution u to improve the solution accuracy resulting in an updated solution
in a separate vector unew. These two vectors represent the two key data structures and are the focus when
measuring corruption propagation. Figure 3.7 shows the average percentage of elements that are corrupted
across all MPI processes (y-axis) due to an injected fault (intensity of color) in the iterations following the
injection iteration (x-axis) for the solution variable u and unew. All runs are aggregated to align the iteration
where injection occurs. This allows corruption percentages in all remaining iterations to be averaged over
all runs. All faults are injected on rank 3, and as time evolves corruption propagation occurs inside this
process indicated by the increase in the intensity of color on the horizontal row for rank 3. Figure 3.8 shows
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a detailed view of propagation measured as percentage of elements corrupted in both u and unew with 90%
confidence inside rank 3. Over time, corruption propagates inside rank 3 and reaches the region of the array
that is communicated through a halo-exchange resulting in corruption of rank 2. This process continues
until all processes are corrupted or the corruption is attenuated. Because Jacobi converges to a solution,
over time the corruption in the variables is removed. When tracking propagation in u, comparisons are made
between the memory of u from the gold and faulty applications. As Jacobi continues to iterate, error does
not appear to reduce because as error due to the fault is removed from the faulty u it is being compared to
an ever more accurate u from the gold application. Only with extra iterations on faulty (beyond what is
run for gold) do the two solution vectors converge. The same logic holds true for the variable unew.
(a) Average percentage of corrupted elements of iterative so-
lution u for Jacobi.
(b) Average percentage of corrupted elements of iterative so-
lution unew for Jacobi.
Figure 3.7: Average percentage in main variables of Jacobi.
Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10 averages the log of the 2-norm between the key variables in the gold and faulty
executions. In both Figures, the logarithm of 0 is replaced with -16. Figure 3.9 shows an increase in the
2-norm first appearing on the faulty rank 3, and over time the corruption propagates to all other processes.
As the iteration count increases there becomes a larger deviation between the gold and faulty executions.
This is due to the corruption propagating to more vector entries and the inability to remove corruption
sufficiently fast to converge back to the gold variables. Figure 3.10 shows a 90% confidence interval on the
log of the 2-norm for rank 3. Throughout all iterations the average log of the 2-norm is expected to be small
indicating that the corruption in most executions does not have much effect on the accuracy of the solutions.
Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12 shows the averages of the log of the max-norm between the key variables
in the gold and faulty executions. As with plots of the 2-norm, the logarithm of 0 is replaced with -16.
Figure 3.9 shows an increase in the max norm appears first on the faulty rank 3, and as time-progresses the
corruption propagates to all other processes. As the iteration count increases there becomes a larger deviation
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Figure 3.8: Average corruption in selected variables on rank 3 for Jacobi within 90% confidence.
(a) Log of average 2-norm of the error in iterative solution u
for Jacobi.
(b) Log of average 2-norm of the error in iterative solution
unew for Jacobi.
Figure 3.9: Log of average 2-norm of the error in main variables of Jacobi.
between the gold and faulty executions. This is due to the corruption propagating and accumulating in more
vector entries and the inability to remove corruption sufficiently fast to converge back to the gold variables.
Figure 3.10 shows a 90% confidence interval on the log of the max norm for rank 3. As propagation and
accumulation occurs at each time-step the average max norm increases in magnitude. However, because
Jacobi is an iterative refinement algorithm any error due to corruption of data can be removed with extra
iterations.
38
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
Number of Iterations After Injection
-18
-17
-16
-15
-14
-13
-12
Lo
g 
of
 2
-n
or
m
u
unew
Figure 3.10: Average 2-norm of the error in selected variables on rank 3 for Jacobi within 90% confidence.
(a) Log of average max-norm of the error in iterative solution
u for Jacobi.
(b) Log of average max-norm of the error in iterative solution
unew for Jacobi.
Figure 3.11: Log of average max-norm of the error in main variables of Jacobi.
After a fault, corruption appears immediately on rank 3. As corruption propagates inside rank 3, it
corrupts values sent to process 2 in a halo exchange. The speed of corruption propagation depends on the
stencil size. This problem uses a 5-point stencil, and the average worst case propagation latency occurs when
an element interior to a local domain is corrupted. On rank 3, this requires m/2 iterations were m is the
local block size. In general, it takes m/4 iterations for ranks without a boundary edge. SDC detected in
Jacobi is within 595 iterations (median 12 iterations) of injection. For any reasonable local block size, once
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Figure 3.12: Average max-norm of the error in selected variables on rank 3 for Jacobi within 90% confidence.
SDC is detected it can be confined to a process and its immediate neighbors; allowing a customized local
recovery scheme to be applied.
HPCCG
Conjugate Gradient (CG) (see Algorithm 3.3) is a popular solver for systems of linear equations. This
algorithm relies on four key variables: the iterative solution xk, search directions pk that are used to update
xk, residual vector rk, and the matrix-vector product A ∗ pk.
Algorithm 3.3: Conjugate Gradient Method.
1 r0 = b−A ∗ x0
2 p0 = r0
3 k = 0
4 while ‖ rk ‖2< tol do
5 αk = (r
k)T rk
(pk)T ∗A∗pk
6 xk+1 = xk + αkpk
7 rk+1 = rk − αk ∗A ∗ pk
8 βk = (r
k+1)T rk+1
(rk)T rk
9 pk+1 = rk+1 + βkpk
10 k = k + 1
As with Jacobi, propagation results for HPCCG are aggregated to align with the iteration in which
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injection occurs. Figure 3.14 shows corruption propagation in the form of the average percentage of elements
corrupted (color) per variable across all MPI processes (y-axis) for subsequent iterations after injection (x-
axis). As corruption propagates locally inside each variable, the horizontal color for the row grows darker,
while regions of low corruption have a lighter color.
Initially, the average percentage of elements corrupted in each vector is small. However, as HPCCG
continues to iterate, corruption begins to propagate both internally and externally of the corrupted process,
rank 3. The most severe corruption is confined to rank 3 and the neighboring processes across the majority of
the iterations. Dependencies between the four variables in Figure 3.14 are due a corruption in the variables
rk, pk, or A ∗ pk, which leads to corruption in the solution vector xk. Furthermore, the SpMV propagates
corruption as shown in the corresponding corruption in pk and A ∗ pk on every processes of each iteration.
Data dependencies in updating other vectors further propagates corruption in A ∗ pk to all other variables.
Ensuring the correctness of pk limits corruption propagation from the SpMV in A ∗ pk and subsequently
corruption propagating to rk and xk.
To see corruption propagation between variables more closely, Figure 3.13 shows the average percentage
of elements from each variable corrupted on rank 3. As with Jacobi, the iterative solution xk increases in
error initially, but over time does not appear to remove error due to soft error corruption. This error is
reduced at each iteration, however the iteration does not converge back to gold ’s xk. Errors in rk closely
follow those in pk as both are used in updating the other through a WAXPBY. As corruption in pk grows and
subsides, A ∗ pk reflects and propagates the corruption accordingly.
The search direction pk is central to corruption propagation as it is used in updating the other variables.
Ensuring that pk is computed correctly helps ensure that the other variables are computed correctly. Because
CG uses inner-products, if masking does not occur, then corruption in input vectors propagates to all
processes in one iteration. Therefore, some form of corruption is resident in all variables within 3 iterations
for runs that did not produce a segmentation fault. Local recovery is still possible, though it is complicated
by the presence of corruption on multiple processes.
Figure 3.15 shows the average log of the 2-norm on each process between the corresponding selected
variables for the gold and faulty . Across all variables the largest deviations are confined to rank 3 and
its neighbor processes. For all variables, except the solution vector xk, there is a strong decease in the
magnitude of the norm as HPCCG continues to iterate. Figure 3.13 shows that this variable maintains a
higher percentage of elements corrupted leading to little reduction in the average log of the 2-norm on rank
3. This is observed in Figure 3.16 that plots the log of the 2-norm along with a 90% confidence interval for
rank 3.
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Figure 3.13: Average corruption in selected variables on rank 3 for HPCCG within 90% confidence.
Figure 3.17 shows the average log of the max-norm on each process between the corresponding selected
variables for the gold and faulty . As with the 2-norm, across all variables the largest deviations are confined
to rank 3 and its neighbor processes. Due to a larger number of vector components corrupted, Figure 3.13, the
solution vector xk on rank 3 does not show a strong decrease in the 2-norm as HPCCG iterates. Figure 3.18
highlights this in more detail with for rank 3.
CoMD
Molecular dynamics codes such as CoMD do not converge to the same solution with each execution of the
program as with HPCCG and Jacobi. Instead, a single run is combined with many other runs to form a
statistical ensemble to analyze the distribution of key properties such as energy. This implies that small
deviations can be masked if they do not modify the distribution. The key variables in CoMD for propagation
analysis are: atom positions, atom momenta, atom forces, and atom energies. CoMD also differs from the
other applications in how it stores its data. Because atoms migrate between processes, arrays are over
allocated leaving space for other atoms from remote processes. This slack space is not contiguous within
the arrays because it is allocated per local cell and not collectively for the entire local domain. The unused
regions of the atoms complicate tracking propagation. Without modifying the data layout of CoMD this
chapter factors out the unused atom storage by using the number of atoms per process instead of the memory
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(a) Average percentage of corrupted vector elements for iter-
ative solution xk.
(b) Average percentage of corrupted vector elements for resid-
ual rk.
(c) Average percentage of corrupted vector elements for search
directions pk.
(d) Average percentage of corrupted vector elements for result
of the SpMV of A ∗ pk.
Figure 3.14: Average percentage of corrupted vector elements for variables in the mini-app HPCCG in
iterations after injection.
allocation size when computing corruption statistics.
Figure 3.19 shows the average percentage of corruption in the key variables of CoMD. Unlike HPCCG,
where the SpMV rapidly propagates corruption between processes, the propagation in CoMD resembles Ja-
cobi with corruption slowly propagating beyond neighboring domain regions. Although slow, the corruption
propagation increases as time evolves which leads to an increased likelihood of the run becoming an outlier
for large numbers of iterations. Over the iterations after an injection, 3% of the runs are classified as outliers
when looking at the energy distribution at the final iteration. All of these outliers are caught by the SDC
check. A more detailed view of the propagation on rank 3 is found in Figure 3.20.
The communication pattern in CoMD consists of point-to-point messages as atoms migrate from process
to process. A single atom contributes to the force calculation of neighboring atoms. This region of influence
is small and needs many iterations for the corruption to spread beyond the initially corrupted region of
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(a) Average 2-norm of corrupted vector elements for iterative
solution xk.
(b) Average 2-norm of corrupted vector elements for residual
rk.
(c) Average 2-norm of corrupted vector elements for search
directions pk.
(d) Average 2-norm of corrupted vector elements for result of
the SpMV of A ∗ pk.
Figure 3.15: Average 2-norm of corrupted vector elements for variables in the mini-app HPCCG in iterations
after injection.
influence. This accounts for slow rate of propagation inside CoMD. Although corruption can propagate to
neighbor processes, it requires tens to hundreds of iterations before corruption of an atom propagates to all
processes. Corruption that impacts the simulation’s energy distribution are detected within two iterations
which allows for little inter-process propagation. Containment domains can be established around the process
triggering the SDC detector and nearest neighbors to allow for partial recovery.
Figure 3.21 shows the average log of the 2-norm on all processes as time evolves between the selected
variables of gold and faulty. Although several iterations are required before corruption appears in Figure 3.19,
in Figure 3.21 corruption is present on all processes within a few iterations. The corruption present is small
enough in magnitude that it is less than the significant deviation tolerance of 1e−10 and does not appear
in Figure 3.19. The processes with the largest magnitude of the corruption a neighboring processes of rank
3. Over time the magnitude does decrease slightly, first on rank 3 and then its neighboring processes in the
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Figure 3.16: Average 2-norm of the error in selected variables on rank 3 for HPCCG within 90% confidence.
domain. Figure 3.22 shows the 2-norm in more detail for rank 3.
Figure 3.23 shows the average log of the max-norm on all processes as time evolves between the selected
variables of gold and faulty. As with the 2-norm, the max-norm shows that corruption is present on all
processes shortly after the fault occurs. Rank 3 shows the largest deviations followed by neighboring processes
in the domain. Over time the magnitude does decrease slightly; first on rank 3 and then its neighboring
processes in the domain. Figure 3.24 shows the max-norm in more detail for rank 3.
Impact of Local Problem Size
To explore how problem size impacts corruption propagation. The preceding application experiments are
re-run with the same number of MPI processes, but with more local work per process. Jacobi sees a 2.25×
increase in the number of grid points per process at 36864. The HPCCG local problem is nx = ny = nz = 16,
a 1.9× increase. Whereas CoMD is run with 62500 atoms, resulting in a 1.9× increase in problem size.
For Jacobi increasing the local problem size causes an increase in the average number of iterations to
corrupt other processes by roughly 2×. Corruption propagation patterns and failure symptoms resemble
previous results. Increasing the local problem size for HPCCG yields no increase in the speed of propagation
to other ranks or a discernible change in failure symptoms. Increasing the problem size for CoMD causes a
corresponding increase in the simulation domain size. The corresponding increase in the domain size keeps
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(a) Average max-norm of corrupted vector elements for itera-
tive solution xk.
(b) Average max-norm of corrupted vector elements for resid-
ual rk.
(c) Average max-norm of corrupted vector elements for search
directions pk.
(d) Average max-norm of corrupted vector elements for result
of the SpMV of A ∗ pk.
Figure 3.17: Average max-norm of corrupted vector elements for variables in the mini-app HPCCG in
iterations after injection.
the density of the atoms constant. Without increasing the density of the atoms, a similar number of atoms
are in the force calculation cut-off region allowing for a similar speed of propagation. In addition, the failure
symptoms frequencies for CoMD are comparable with previous results.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, propagation of corruption due to a soft errors is considered at two levels macro/micro.
Micro-level propagation shows the latency of symptoms of soft errors, and how compiler optimizations affect
this. Macro-level propagation results show the speed and intensity of corruption on the process suffering the
fault. The following Chapter 4, discusses the fault injection tool FlipIt.
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Figure 3.18: Average max norm of the error in selected variables on rank 3 for HPCCG within 90%
confidence.
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(a) Average percentage of corrupted vector elements for posi-
tion vector.
(b) Average percentage of corrupted vector elements for mo-
mentum vector.
(c) Average percentage of corrupted vector elements for force
vector.
(d) Average percentage of corrupted vector elements for en-
ergy vector.
Figure 3.19: Average percentage of corrupted vector elements for variables in the mini-app CoMD in
iterations after injection.
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Figure 3.20: Average corruption in selected variables on rank 3 for CoMD.
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(a) Average log of 2-norm for position vector. (b) Average log of 2-norm for momentum vector.
(c) Average log of 2-norm for force vector. (d) Average log of 2-norm for energy vector.
Figure 3.21: Average log of 2-norm for variables in the mini-app CoMD in iterations after injection.
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Figure 3.22: Average log of 2-norm in selected variables on rank 3 for CoMD.
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(a) Average log of max-norm for position vector. (b) Average log of max-norm for momentum vector.
(c) Average log of max-norm for force vector. (d) Average log of max-norm for energy vector.
Figure 3.23: Average log of max-norm for variables in the mini-app CoMD in iterations after injection.
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Figure 3.24: Average log of max-norm in selected variables on rank 3 for CoMD.
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Chapter 4
Fault Injection
Portions of this chapter are taken from the publication “FlipIt: An LLVM Based Fault Injector for HPC” [18]
4.1 Introduction
To assess the resiliency of an application and to enable efficient fault injection we make the following
contributions:
• the development of a robust LLVM based fault injector that targets HPC applications;
• an overview in its utility as a general purpose fault injection framework; and
• a demonstration of its usability, scalability, and robustness on production level HPC code.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section, discusses related background
in the area of fault injection. Section 4.3 details the design, use, and adaptation to individual applications.
Results from its usability, scalability, and robustness are shown in Section 4.4.
4.2 Background
There are many forms of fault injectors. The closer the fault is injected to physical hardware, the more
accurate and realistic the fault injector. At the lowest level, injections come in two forms: real and simulated.
In real injections, the hardware is irradiated with a neutron beam. While this method is highly accurate,
it has significant drawbacks mainly its cost and availability to a limited number of researchers, which limits
its applicability to HPC.
Simulated injections comprise many techniques at both the hardware and software level. At the hardware
level, gate-accurate models are constructed, and fault injection occurs systematically with gate level granu-
larity. With gate-accurate simulations, execution of a full application is possible, but a large scale machine
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is prohibitive due to execution overhead. A fault injection framework that operates with low overhead on
current hardware is needed to inject faults in HPC applications.
Since DRAMs have a higher level of protection from silent errors than processors thanks to being easier
to protect by ECC and Chipkill [32], the focus here is on faults that arise in the processor. Section 4.3 details
the design of the fault injector that simulates the presence of soft errors as the manifestation of bit-flips
in register values. KULFI [97] is a publicly available LLVM based fault injector. Although not specifically
designed for HPC applications, its structure provides a basis for the fault injector developed here.
4.3 Fault Injector
FlipIt1 is structured as an LLVM [62] compiler pass and is based on KULFI [97]. Notable extensions have
been added to increase its robustness and efficacy. Such extensions include:
• support for more data types;
• ability to work with multiple source files simultaneously;
• user customized fault distribution and event logger;
• support for a larger subset of the LLVM instructions; and
• MPI rank aware.
FlipIt chooses to use an LLVM compiler pass to simulate transient errors instead of randomly flipping
bits inside the binary in order to provide more control over time and location of an injected fault. FlipIt is
structured in two parts: (1) a compiler pass that identifies locations for fault injection and inserts code to
perform the injections and (2) a runtime API that defines when and where faults occur.
4.3.1 LLVM Compiler Pass Design
The compiler pass proceeds by iterating over all functions in a source file. On discovery of a function
marked for injection, the included instructions are surrounded by instructions that injects a fault based on
a probability model. Here, a fault results in a single bit-flip in a source operand or the result of an LLVM
instruction. The compiler pass identifies and instruments locations for faults to be injected at runtime.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the code transformation for a single add instruction.
The result of the add instruction is sign extended before being passed to a function crptInt that performs
the injection. The result of the crptInt function is equivalent to the result of the add if no fault is injected,
1https://github.com/joncalhoun40/FlipIt
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define i32 @add(i32 %a, i32 %b) #0 {
entry:
%add = add nsw i32 %a, %b
ret i32 %add
}
(a) Original LLVM IR.
define i32 @add(i32 %a, i32 %b) #0 {
entry:
%add = add nsw i32 %a, %b
%data = sext i32 %add i64
%tmp = call i64 @crptInt(i32 788529152,
double 0.01, i64 %data)
%crptAdd = trunc i64 %tmp to i32
ret i32 %crptAdd
}
(b) Transformed LLVM IR.
Figure 4.1: Code transformation by FlipIt to inject faults.
or has a single-bit that differs if a fault is injected. After truncating back to the original data size, all
subsequent use of the add’s result variable are replaced with the value returned from the injection function.
This process continues for every instruction inside the function.
Corrupting Functions
As shown in Figure 4.1, a function call to crptInt is used to determine if a fault should be injected and to
perform the injection. Algorithm 4.1 provides generic logic for the injection. In every corrupting function,
the argument list is the same except for the data type of the value being corrupted. Table 4.1 details the
argument list of the corrupt functions from left to right. The first argument is a 32-bit unsigned integer
containing three packed values: byte location for injection, bit location for injection, and the unique fault
site index. Figure 4.2, shows how the bit fields in the 32-bit unsigned integer are partitioned. The byte
field allows for a fixed byte location (0–7) for injection, and the bit field allows for a fixed bit inside that
byte to corrupt (0–7). To inject into a random byte and bit location, the value of -1 can be provided. If
the byte specified is outside the range of the data type, FlipIt uses the modulus operator to wrap the byte
to the correct range. The unique fault site index comprises the lowest 24 bits in the compressed argument.
This allows for 16,777,216 unique static instructions to be instrumented for fault injection. The remaining
arguments of the corruption function are the probability of injecting a fault in this location and the data to
corrupt.
By default, and in Section 4.4, FlipIt assumes that all LLVM instructions have an equal probability of
experiencing a fault. However, in practice, each LLVM instruction should have differing probabilities that
are a function of the underlining hardware. Therefore, if information is known for a processor a priori, then
the scaled probabilities should be incorporated into to the configuration file used by the FlipIt compiler pass.
Complex data types — e.g. user defined classes and structures — pointers with multiple levels of indirec-
tion, are not considered for injection in KULFI. All data types are represented using a finite number of bits;
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Algorithm 4.1: Generic corrupt logic.
Input: site prob: Probability that this site is faulty.
site index: Unique index of this fault site.
data: Value eligible for corruption.
Result: Data unmodified(no injection), or data with a single bit-flip(injection).
1 if not shouldInject(injector on, rank inject, site prob) then
2 return data
3 else
4 bit position ← random bit position in targeted byte
5 logInjection(site index, bit position)
6 data corrupt ← data ⊕ (0x1  bit position)
7 return data corrupt
Table 4.1: Corrupt function’s arguments (left to right).
Argument Description
1 Compressed argument: Byte location, bit location, and unique fault site index.
2 Probability that this instruction is faulty.
3 Data that can become corrupted by a bit-flip.
therefore, FlipIt allows for injections into these data types by first casting the variable to a 64-bit integer.
Next, a call to corrupt the 64-bit integer is inserted and the value returned from this call is cast back to the
appropriate data type. As with all corruptions, all subsequent uses are replaced.
FlipIt’s instrumentation is limited to code it directly compiles; however, a function targeted for corruption
may include function calls. Corrupting these function calls is critical to properly modeling a fault function.
There are two cases that must be considered. First, if source code is available for the function it should
be compiled and instrumented with FlipIt. Second, if the function is unable to be compiling is not an
option — e.g. due to unavailable source (pre-compiled library) — then FlipIt is provided the probability of
byte bit
fault site 
index
31    28    24                0  
param
Figure 4.2: Partitioning of compressed argument for FlipIt’s corrupting functions.
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injecting a fault into return value or argument of the call instruction. The probability is read from the
compiler passes configuration file as a key-value pair with the function’s name. Calculating the probability
is left to the user. One option uses the function’s runtime to estimate the number of instructions executed.
The probability is proportional to the number of instructions inside the function. This second method of
injecting into functions ignores side effects of the function. ABFT resiliency schemes focus on data directly
pertaining to the algorithm — e.g. pressure variable, a matrix. Modifications of global/external state inside
a function does not impact the FlipIt’s ability to corrupt the application data that ABFT resiliency schemes
operate on; either before or after the function call.
Parallel Design
In order to support HPC applications, our fault injector is aware of the processes’ current MPI rank inside
MPI COMM WORLD. This allows fault injections on a subset of ranks specified at runtime via command line
arguments or through FlipIt’s API. Large scale machines have custom MPI distributions that are tuned for
performance. Because a non-negligible portion of time is spent in MPI routines, FlipIt must consider MPI
calls as potentially faulty. The source code for the machine optimal MPI is not available. This implies that
FlipIt needs to utilize the method outlined previously to when inject faults into MPI routines.
Compiler Log File
As the compiler pass instruments source code, details about the injection locations are logged for use when
controlling injections with the runtime API and during analysis of fault injection runs. In particular, FlipIt
logs following information when instrumenting code:
• unique fault site number (enumeration of static instructions);
• location in instruction — e.g. result or operand;
• instruction type — e.g. Arith-FP, Arith-Fix, Pointer, Control-Branch, Control-Loop; and
• source file location and line number.
Definitions of FlipIt’s instruction classification types are found in Table 4.2. An example of a compiler
log file in ASCII is shown in Figure 4.3. In practice, FlipIt creates binary log files to reduce the file size.
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Table 4.2: FlipIt instruction classification types.
Instruction Type Description
Arith-FP Floating-point arithmetic — e.g. add, multiply.
Arith-Fix Fixed-point (integer) arithmetic — e.g. add, multiply.
Pointer Calculations directly related to the use of pointers — e.g. loads, stores, address calculation.
Control-Branch Comparisons and branching.
Control-Loop Operations on loop induction variables.
Function Name: waxpby
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#1291 FCmp Arg 0 Control-Branch /home/jcalhoun/HPCCG-1.0/waxpby.cpp:53
#1292 ICmp Arg 1 Control-Branch /home/jcalhoun/HPCCG-1.0/waxpby.cpp:57
#1293 Add Result Arith-Fix /home/jcalhoun/HPCCG-1.0/waxpby.cpp:57
#1294 Add Result Arith-Fix /home/jcalhoun/HPCCG-1.0/waxpby.cpp:57
#1295 Add Result Arith-Fix /home/jcalhoun/HPCCG-1.0/waxpby.cpp:57
#1296 And Result Arith-Fix /home/jcalhoun/HPCCG-1.0/waxpby.cpp:57
#1297 ICmp Arg 0 Control-Branch /home/jcalhoun/HPCCG-1.0/waxpby.cpp:57
...
Figure 4.3: ASCII version compiler log file.
4.3.2 Usability and Extensibility
Source Modification
FlipIt is designed to require minimal modification to existing codes while at the same time providing a
high degree of robustness and flexibility to conduct detailed fault injection campaigns. Figure 4.4 shows the
minimum required changes to the mini-app HPCCG in order to use FlipIt. The call to FLIPIT Init should
precede all usage of code compiled with our fault injector, and no such code should be executed after the
call to FLIPIT Finalize. FLIPIT Init requires the processes MPI rank; therefore, FlipIt ensures that MPI
has been initialized by electing the user to insert calls to FLIPIT Init. FlipIt can not do this inside the
compiler as it is possible that the file containing MPI Init is never seen by the compiler pass. To provide
the user with a more fine grain control over fault injection, the functions in Table 4.3 are provided.
Compiling
The use of FlipIt requires little modification to current building practices. Once functions have been identified
by the programmer, the source files containing the functions is recompiled using our compiler pass. Figure
4.4 shows this process with a change in the Makefile.
The compiler script flipit-cc handles the more complicated process of instrumenting the code. This
process is outlined in Figure 4.5. Step 1 in the compilation process compiles the original source with clang2
2https://clang.llvm.org/
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#include "FlipIt/corrupt/corrupt.h"
…
int main(int argc, char* argv[]){
…
MPI_Comm_rank(MPI_COMM_WORLD, &rank);
FLIPIT_Init(rank, argc, argv, time(NULL));
…
FLIPIT_Finalize(NULL);
MPI_Finalize();
CXX = $(FLIPIT_PATH)/scripts/flipit-cc
LINKER = $(FLIPIT_PATH)/scripts/flipit-cc
CPP_OPT_FLAGS = -O2 -g
# set mpicc includes paths and libraries for machine
SHOW = " -I/usr/local/include -L/usr/local/lib"
       " -lmpich -lopa -lmpl -lrt -lpthread "
CPP_LIB = " -ldl -L/usr/lib/ -lm -lstdc++ "
HPCCG.cpp
Makefile
FlipIt/scripts/config.py
Figure 4.4: Blue text shows required changes to HPCCG source files (HPCCG.cpp and Makefile) and
additional libraries to FlipIt should link against (FlipIt/scripts/config.py) to enable fault injection.
Table 4.3: User callable functions.
Function name Description
FLIPIT Init Initializes fault injector. Turns on injector.
FLIPIT Finalize Cleans up injector. Turns off injector.
FLIPIT SetInjector Zero: turns off injector. Non-zero: turns on injector.
FLIPIT SetFaultProbability Sets the probability function with a user defined function.
FLIPIT SetCustomLogger Sets user defined logging function. Called on all injections.
FLIPIT SetRankInject Zero: rank not faulty. Non-zero: rank can suffer faults.
FLIPIT CountdownTimer Sets number of instructions to execute before injecting.
FLIPIT GetExecutedInstructionCount Gets number of fault injection locations traversed.
FLIPIT GetInjectionCount Gets number of faults injected locally.
FLIPIT SetMaxInjections Sets max number of faults for process.
FLIPIT GetMaxInjections Gets maximum number of faults locally.
into LLVM bitcode. LLVM bitcode is an intermediate representation (IR) formate that optimizations and
transformations are performed on before generating machine code. It is necessary to compile with -g to
relate fault sites indexed by the compiler pass to the source code line. If this flag is omitted, the compiler
pass relates the injection to the location in the bit-code which does not always have a clear translation back
to the source code due to a provided optimization level. Generally it is always possible to map an injection
location to a function. The bitcode generated by clang is linked with a bitcode header file that defines the
interfaces for the corruption functions in Step 2. Step 3 takes the resulting bit code and runs the FlipIt
compiler pass generating the log file and the instrumented bitcode. Table 4.4 details all possible arguments
to the compiler pass and their default values. Step 4 compiles the bit-code into object code for linking.
Once all the object code is generated, the application is linked against the FlipIt runtime static library as
the executable is generated.
For MPI applications, mpicc is a wrapper around a native compiler. The compiler flags -show and
-showme for MPICH and OpenMPI, respectively, provides the exact compiler command used to com-
60
*.c *.bc *.bc *.o
Link with 
header
Instrument 
with FlipIt
Compile to 
object code
flipit-cc
Compile to 
LLVM IR
header.bc
Figure 4.5: Steps in compiling and instrumenting code with flipit-cc
Table 4.4: Compiler pass arguments.
Argument Type Req. Default Description
config string No FlipIt.config Path to configuration file.
funcList string Yes — Functions to corrupt.
prob double Yes 1e-8 Default per instruction fault probability.
byte int No -1 Byte to flip bit in (0–7). (-1 random).
bit int No -1 Byte to flip bit in (0–7). (-1 random).
ptr bool No true Allow bit-flips in Pointer instructions.
ctrl bool No true Allow bit-flips in Control-Branch and Control-Loop instructions.
arith bool No true Allow bit-flips in Arith-FP and Arith-Fix instruction.
srcFile string No UNKNOWN Name of the original source file being compiled.
stateFile string No .FlipItState Name of the state file being updated when compiling.
Used to provide unique fault site indices.
pile the source file. For successful compilation of MPI applications it is necessary to inform FlipIt of
the libraries and include paths that mpicc wraps. These libraries and paths are added into the file
FlipIt/scripts/config.py in the SHOW variable. In addition, libraries required for C++ applications can
be provided and any other libraries that may not be explicitly stated in the Makefile.
Programmer Control
The choice to use a static library for the corruption routines is influenced by three key points: 1) the need to
compile multiple source files for a single executable; 2) the ability to limit overhead of the fault injector; and
3) to allow for application specific behavior such as the collection of user defined statistics. Straightforward
use of KULFI is restricted to one source file, which limits use by requiring the programmer to place all
functions of interest into a single source file, or by requiring multiple recompilations to cover all functions
of interest, but sacrificing the ability to look at complex function interactions.
61
FlipIt’s approach to fault injection increases the static and dynamic instruction count for the application,
which leads to increased execution time. The overhead is mitigated when FlipIt is given more direction about
where and when to inject a fault. During compile time, the compiler pass can be directed to corrupt a subset
of functions and instructions allow for selective injections via the configuration file, or the redefinition of
the shouldInject function (see Algorithm 4.2) called by each corruptible function. However, if the location
targeted for injection changes, then the application would need to be recompiled. At a high level, FlipIt
provides a series of command line arguments listed in Table 4.5 to control which MPI ranks experience an
injection and which fault injection locations are valid dynamically at runtime. The command line arguments
are sufficient to pinpoint where a fault is injected, but do not easily account for when. To address this, the
runtime API functions in Table 4.3 assist in refining the location and time for injection with combination of
the functions FLIPIT SetInjector, FLIPIT CountdownTimer, and FLIPIT SetFaultProbability. These
functions are used in Section 4.4 to perform a selective injection into the computation of the residual vector.
Algorithm 4.2: Basic shouldInject logic.
Input: injector on: Boolean signifying if injector is on.
rank inject: Boolean signifying if rank is faulty.
site prob: Probability that this site is faulty.
Result: Boolean indicating an injection should occur.
1 P ← probability()
2 if injector on and rank inject and site prob > P then
3 return TRUE
4 else
5 return FALSE
Table 4.5: Command line arguments for fault injector.
Argument Description
--numFaulty Number of faulty MPI ranks.
--faulty List of faulty MPI ranks.
--numberFaulty Number of faulty MPI ranks.
--numberFaultyLoc Number of active fault locations.
--faultyLoc List of active fault locations.
--stateFile Location of statistic file generated by compiler pass.
Analysis
When the code is compiled, the compiler pass generates a log file that specifies all locations where faults can
be injected. As the application is run, information about the faults being injected is logged per rank for later
inspection. Two types of data are logged every time a fault is injected. The first kind is information about
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the faults themselves — e.g. the fault site numbers, bits flipped, and values from the fault distribution. This
information is used in conjunction with the fault site log files to determine in what function and where in this
function the fault is injected. The second type of information logged on each fault injection is accomplished
through a user-defined function. This user defined function is set using FLIPIT SetCustomLogger (see
Table 4.3). Application specific information — e.g. iteration number, application phase — can be logged to
obtain a temporal look of the injection during the application.
Even if no faults are injected, statistics are still collected. For every rank, a histogram is generated
showing the frequency of each fault site. To determine if the execution path of the application changes due
to a fault, the histogram generated in the fault free case is compared with the histogram from an application
run with faults. Any discrepancies in these histograms suggest differing paths of execution. Further insights
are found by using the injection log and the compiler logs alongside the histograms to determine precisely
what occurred due to the fault. To simplify this process the fault analysis tool FaultSight3 can be used to
quickly and efficiently analyze the results of a fault injection campaign.
4.4 Experimental Results
In order to show the scalability and flexibility of FlipIt, sections of Algebraic multigrid (AMG) solver in
HYPRE4 are compiled with FlipIt to enable fault injection during solving of the linear system. AMG uses
one iteration of Jacobi relaxation for smoothing while solving a 2D Laplacian with zero on the boundaries to
a tolerance of 1e−7. Each process has 16384 degrees of freedom. Profiling HYPRE allows us to determine
the call stack inside HYPRE BoomerAMGSolve. All functions in this call stack are instrumented by FlipIt. For
the mini-apps, CoMD5 and HPCCG6 the entire mini-app is compiled with FlipIt, and 4000 atoms over 500
time-steps and a local block size of nx = ny = nz = 48 per process, respectively.
4.4.1 Scalability
To characterize the scalability of FlipIt, weak scaling experiments, Figure 4.6, for the applications are run
on Blue Waters with 16 MPI processes per node. Every data point is the average of five runs. In this
figure, FlipIt is fully active on all MPI ranks and fault sites; however, no fault is injected due to every
location having a fault probability of 0. FlipIt’s two methods of determining when to inject a fault are
tested: Probability calculates a pseudo random value from a distribution at each fault site, and Countdown
3https://github.com/einarhorn/faultsight
4https://computation.llnl.gov/projects/hypre-scalable-linear-solvers-multigrid-methods/software
5https://github.com/exmatex/CoMD
6https://mantevo.org/applications.php
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decrements a counter of the number of dynamic fault sites to iterate over before injecting. In Figure 4.6, the
execution time for the instrumented code time has a similar scaling behavior of the original code. FlipIt’s
instrumentation increases computation but not communication. As a result, the scaling behavior changes
by a constant factor. Looking at the two methods determining when to inject a fault, the instrumented
code that calculates a pseudo random number, Probability, adds additional computation and sees a larger
overhead than Countdown that decrements a counter.
To quantify the impact on performance, instrumentation overhead is presented in Figure 4.7. FlipIt in-
creases the dynamic instruction count, which produces a corresponding increase computation time; however,
as HYPRE utilizes more processes, communication time begins to dominate computation time. As this
occurs, FlipIt’s overhead diminishes as the problem scales; this is due to masking by inter-node communi-
cation. HPCCG shows a similar trend, but it is not as pronounced as HYPRE. CoMD shows no decrease in
overhead as the number of processes increase; this is due to its good weak scaling behavior.
4.4.2 Selective Injection
To highlight the flexibility of FlipIt, we inject a fault in the first element of the residual vector just before
it is written to memory. The fault occurs during the first cycle on the finest level during the construction of
the residual vector. In order to yield an accurate injection, the fault site location must be known. Inspecting
the compiler pass logs determines the correct fault site index. This information is passed to FlipIt along
with the faulty rank number, 0, via the command line arguments. Because the residual is computed via
a SpMV routine that is also used during problem setup, two calls to FLIPIT SetInjector are added, one
to turn off the injector after initialization of FlipIt and the other to turn it on just before calculating the
residual. Figure 4.8 shows the fault’s effect on the relative residual, the stopping criterion for AMG. The
name of the trend indicates which bit is flipped in the 64-bit floating-point number.
In this location, a single bit-flip is either masked by the application or increases the number of iterations.
Since this fault occurs in the floating-point arithmetic of the problem, it would not be detected and would
create silent data corruption (SDC). Indication of an error does not occur until the application’s results were
analyzed. This high latency suggests that work should be done to design SDC detectors to catch such SDCs
early limiting their impact on HPC applications. In order to test the effectiveness of these SDC detectors,
a fault injector such as FlipIt is required.
FlipIt allows targeting of different classes of instructions, and depending upon which classes are active,
the effects on the application vary. The classifications of Control-Branch and Control-Loop are combined
into Control , and the classifications of Arith-FP and Arith-Fix are combined into Arithmetic. Table 4.6
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Pointer Control Arithmetic All
Crash 41% 29% 21% 29%
More V-Cycles 6% 0% 6% 4%
Same V-Cycles 53% 71% 73% 67%
Table 4.6: Results of injecting into certain types.
reports the average of 1,000 trials and shows injections into pointers have a corresponding increase in the
percent of trials that crash. Likewise, injection into arithmetic operations of AMG or access to the incorrect
data with corrupted pointers, increases the percent of trials that require a higher number of iterations
required to converge. There is a small increase in the percent of trials that crash with control injections due
to taking incorrect paths and incorrect indexing. By the use of these instruction classes, unique injection
campaigns can be created allowing the study of an application’s susceptibility to certain types of errors and
the effectiveness of detection schemes.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter presents the design of LLVM based fault injection tool FlipIt. In addition, experimental results
show the scalability and overhead of FlipIt. The usability of FlipIt is explored by selectively injecting a fault
inside the AMG solver in HYPRE. The following chapter, Chapter 5, presents a tool is built on top of FlipIt
that tracks corruption propagation in application variables at a high and low level.
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(a) Main computation loop runtime for HYPRE.
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(b) Main computation loop runtime for HPCCG.
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(c) Main computation loop runtime for CoMD.
Figure 4.6: Weak scaling of applications with and without compilation with FlipIt.
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Figure 4.7: Overhead of instrumentation of applications compared to reference code.
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Figure 4.8: Selective injection in residual calculation on rank 0. 16 processes with approximately 16,384
unknowns per process.
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Chapter 5
Soft Error Propagation Tracking
Portions of this chapter are taken from the publications “Towards a More Complete Understanding of SDC
Propagation” [21]
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, error resulting from an activated fault is referred to as state corruption or simply as corruption
in order to avoid confusion with numerical errors in HPC applications. To assist in the analysis of the
propagation of corruption of inside applications, an open source LLVM based tool called SDCProp1 is
developed to track propagation at various levels of granularity.
5.2 Tracking Propagation
Once a fault is activated, corruption is present in the system. The location of the initial corrupted value is
critical to identifying corruption propagation. During the execution of the remaining program instructions,
the corruption can be masked due to programmatic or algorithmic properties. This can lead to a system
detectable event, such as a segmentation fault or can propagate to corrupt more of the program state and
become a silent data corruption (SDC). SDC detection schemes detect by investigating application state for
significant deviations and abnormalities.
*.c clang *.bc
LLVM Corruption 
Propagation Pass
FlipIt
*.bc clang *.o
Figure 5.1: Overview of the instrumentation process that transforms source code to be able to track propa-
gation and inject faults.
1https://github.com/joncalhoun40/SDCProp
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Two levels of corruption propagation are considered:
macro tracks deviations in the state variables through the simulation; and
micro tracks deviations in the loads, stores, and other low-level operations.
In order to track corruption propagation at both the micro and macro level, an LLVM-based [62] instru-
mentation tool, SDCProp, is developed to emulate lock-step execution of a correctly executed (gold) along
with a faulty execution (faulty). Optimized LLVM IR code is run though a compiler pass to instrument it
to track corruption propagation and to insert fault injection code before being compiled to object code (see
Figure 5.1). Figure 5.2 illustrates the instrumentation process performed in the compiler pass. Source code
is instrumented (Section 5.2.1) after compiler optimizations are performed in order to mitigate the impact
of instrumentation on the object code generated. An API call at natural points in the application — e.g.
end of an iteration — tracks propagation of application level memory allocations at the macro-level. At the
micro-level, the LLVM compiler pass adds instrumentation to track propagation at a load/store granularity
and relates loads/stores to application level memory allocations.
After replication, there exists two distinct sets of instructions: one for the gold application (green) and one
for the faulty application (red) (see Figure 5.2a). Instructions for the gold application forms a reference set
of loads, stores, and correct program behavior that the faulty application instructions are compared against.
Replicating all instructions creates separate memory images for both the gold and faulty applications. Thus,
these two sets of instructions do not share the same data.
5.2.1 Micro-level Propagation Tracking
At the micro-level, loads and stores are monitored for deviations since these operations directly impact
the state variables. Stores commit erroneous values to state variables, while loads allow for reuse and
propagation of corrupted data. Examining corruption propagation at the micro-level allows a fine grain
view of corruption propagation inside the application. This is useful in assessing the bound on a pointer
dereference leading to a segmentation fault, to determine the number of loads and stores that are perturbed,
to quantify the deviation when a corruption is masked by the application, and to examine the impact of
compiler optimizations at a fine-grain level.
Because instructions from gold and faulty are interleaved, corresponding operations — i.e. loads and
stores — are next to each other allowing for straightforward comparison of both the values and the ad-
dresses. To simplify the comparison, all loads and stores in faulty are replaced with an instrumentation call
(see Figure 5.2c). In addition to determining if a loaded or stored value deviates from the expected gold
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a = ld a ptr
b = add a, 2
c = cmp b, 0
br c, if, else
a f = ld a ptr f
b f = add a f, 2
c f = cmp b f, 0
br c f, if, else
(a) Code is duplicated forming two sets gold (green code)
and faulty (red code).
a = ld a ptr
a f = ld a ptr f
b = add a, 2
b f = add a f, 2
c = cmp b, 0
c f = cmp b f, 0
br c, if, else
br c f, if, else
(b) gold and faulty code is interleaved to emulate
lock-step execution.
a = ld a ptr
a f = chkLd(a ptr f, a ptr, a)
b = add a, 2
b f = add a f, 2
c = cmp b, 0
c f = cmp b f, 0
br c, if, else
br c f, if, else
(c) All loads and stores in faulty are replaced with
instrumentation calls to track corruption propaga-
tion at a load/store level of accuracy.
a = ld a ptr
a f = chkLd(a ptr f, a ptr, a)
b = add a, 2
b f = add a f, 2
c = cmp b, 0
c f = cmp b f, 0
checkDiverged(c, c f)
br c, if, else
(d) faulty branches are replaced with an instru-
mentation call to check for control flow divergence.
a = ld a ptr
a f = chkLd(a ptr f, a ptr, a)
a f crpt = crpt(a f)
b = add a, 2
b f = add a f crpt, 2
b f crpt = crpt(b f)
c = cmp b, 0
c f = cmp b f crpt, 0
checkDiverged(c, c f)
br c, if, else
(e) faulty instructions are run though the fault in-
jector FlipIt (see Chapter 4) to instrument them
for fault injection.
Figure 5.2: Overview of the code transformation for micro-level propagation tracking.
value, the deviation can be calculated (with additional computational cost) along with information on the
associated allocation. The latter requires the base address and size of all memory allocations to be logged by
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instrumenting memory allocation calls and by inserting the base address and size into a table. Information
that relates the gold and faulty allocations is also logged since it is used to assess macro-level propagation.
Algorithms 5.1 and 5.2 detail the logic of the instrumentation calls for loads and stores, respectively. The
function call to checkInMemory determines whether an address is contained in a logged memory allocation
of the faulty application. The information collected inside the function logDeviation of Algorithm 5.3
accumulates information into the same variables for both loads and stores; however, in practice a vector of
statistics exists for loads and stores. If a store is outside an allocated memory region of the faulty application,
then the address and value are added into an outside store hash table to allow subsequent loads to read the
incorrectly written value and to prevent overwriting of data used by the gold application. This is illustrated
in Figure 5.3. Conversely, if a load from faulty occurs outside an allocated memory region, the load proceeds
only if the address does not exist in the outside store hash table. If the address is found in the outside store
hash table, the faulty address is dereferenced in an effort to generate a segmentation fault, but execution
proceeds with the value from the store hash table. This process is illustrated in Figure 5.4.
Algorithm 5.1: Logic for load instrumentation function call.
Input: fptr: Address from faulty application.
gptr: Address from gold application.
gvalue: Value from the gold load.
Result: Value contained at the faulty memory address.
1 Function chkLd(fptr, gptr, gvalue)
2 in memory ← checkInMemory(fptr)
3 if not in memory then
4 in store table ← checkInStoreTable(fptr);
5 if in store table then
6 fvalue ← readStoreTable(fptr)
7 *fptr {Attempt to generate segmentation fault}
8 else
9 fvalue ← *fptr {Read memory}
10 else
11 fvalue ← *fptr {Read memory}
12 logDeviation(fptr, gptr, fvalue, gvalue, in memory);
13 return fvalue
Once a fault is injected, it propagates to registers and memory locations based on data dependencies.
Periodically, these data dependencies flow to a comparison used in a branch. Control flow in the lock-step
execution relies on the values from the gold application (see Figure 5.2d). Comparisons in faulty remain, but
the branching instruction is replaced with an instrumentation call to log information about this branching
deviation. Due to lock-step style execution, micro-level propagation tracking is unable to accurately resolve
control flow divergence. Resolving this requires a coarser view of propagation tracking: macro-propagation
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Figure 5.3: Logic of store instrumentation call.
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Figure 5.4: Logic of load instrumentation call.
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Algorithm 5.2: Logic for store instrumentation function call.
Input: fptr: Address from faulty application.
fvalue: Value from the faulty application to store.
gptr: Address from gold application.
gvalue: Value from the gold application stored.
1 Function chkSt(fptr, fvalue, gptr, gvalue)
2 in memory ← checkInMemory(fptr)
3 logDeviation(fptr, gptr, fvalue, gvalue, in memory)
4 if not in memory then
5 writeStoreTable(fptr, fvalue) {Write to outside store hash table}
6 *fptr {Attempt to generate segmentation fault}
7 else
8 *fptr ← fvalue {Write memory}
9 return
Algorithm 5.3: Logic for logging information on deviation of load or store at the micro-level.
Input: fptr: Address from faulty application.
gptr: Address from gold application.
fvalue: Value from the faulty application.
gvalue: Value from the gold application.
in memory: Boolean. faulty address in memory and not outside store hash table.
1 Function logDeviation(fptr, gptr, fvalue, gvalue, in memory)
2 dev ← abs(fvalue - gvalue)
3 if dev > tol then
4 if not in memory then
5 num access outside ← num access outside + 1
6 max deviation ← max(max deviation, dev)
7 num deviated access ← num deviated access + 1
8 return
tracking.
To resolve control flow divergence and to handle regions of code not open to instrumentation — e.g.
MPI Send, MPI Recv — function calls are duplicated. For functions that modify global state and yield a
different result when called by both the gold and faulty code — e.g. rand, MPI Init — the return value is
duplicated allowing both the gold and faulty codes to proceed with the intended value/action.
For functions open to instrumentation, the LLVM pass creates a new version of that function with an
extended interface. The function’s argument list is duplicated providing arguments for the gold and faulty
code. In addition, the return type is modified to return a structure containing two elements: the return
value for both the gold and the faulty code. Code contained inside the original function is duplicated and
combined as shown in Figure 5.2. faulty code depends on and consumes the faulty arguments, and the gold
code depends on and consumes the gold arguments.
After the gold and faulty codes have been merged and all instrumentation is complete, faulty instructions
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are passed to FlipIt (see Chapter 4) our LLVM based fault injector, to instrument the faulty instructions for
fault injection (see Figure 5.2e). For instructions that have been replaced with instrumentation calls, FlipIt
is instructed to only inject faults in arguments belonging to the faulty code. Arguments coming from gold
will not suffer fault injection in instrumentation calls. Instructions selected for fault injection are classified
into the following categories based on its use in code: floating-point arithmetic (Arith-FP), fixed-point
integer arithmetic (Arith-Fix ), pointer and address calculation (Pointer), and branching, comparisons, and
loop induction variables (Control). Latency, in number of instructions, counts dynamically executed LLVM
instructions.
5.2.2 Macro-level Propagation Tracking
Macro-level propagation tracking targets the deviation of high-level state variables, data structures, and
propagation across process boundaries. To facilitate tracking propagation of corruption in state variables,
the base address of all memory allocations along with the allocation’s length are stored in a table. During
compilation, the LLVM corruption propagation pass inserts an instrumentation call after the memory alloca-
tion in the gold and faulty code that logs both allocations into the table. Furthermore, this instrumentation
call creates a relationship between the two allocations allowing for comparison of indices when computing
propagation statistics. Algorithm 5.4 details the logic used when comparing two memory allocations. By
default, only the percent of elements corrupted, 2-norm, and max-norm between the gold and faulty memory
allocations is logged for post run analysis.
Algorithm 5.4: Logic for comparing two memory allocations and generating propagation statistics.
1 for i ← 0 to num allocs do
2 gbase ← goldAllocAddr[i] {Base address of gold allocation}
3 fbase ← faultyAllocAddr[i] {Base address of faulty allocation}
4 gsize ← goldAllocSize[i] {Number of bytes in gold allocation}
5 fsize ← faultyAllocSize[i] {Number of bytes in faulty allocation}
6 numElemDiff ← calcNumDiffElem(gbase, fbase, gsize, fsize, tol)
7 norm2 ← calc2norm(gbase, fbase, gsize, fsize)
8 maxNorm ← calcMaxNorm(gbase, fbase, gsize, fsize)
9 saveResults(fbase, numElemDiff, norm2, maxNorm) {Log for post run analysis}
Comparing the state of all allocated variables is expensive; therefore, comparison points are placed at
natural termination points — e.g. end of an iteration. These locations correspond to locations where SDC
checks are often placed and checkpointing occurs. Initially, corruption is confined to the process in which the
fault occurred. As the application progresses, inter-process communication allows corruption to propagate
beyond the process suffering the fault. Understanding how fast this occurs and which processes are likely to
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have corrupted data allows for only a subset of processes to recover by checkpoint-restart or a more tailored
algorithmic solution.
Unlike micro-level propagation tracking, macro-level propagation tracking is able to resolve divergence
in the control flow graph by executing functions to completion once for the gold arguments and lastly for
the faulty arguments. Control flow may diverge inside the function, but after the function returns, the gold
and faulty resolves the control flow divergence. Thus, comparing the states of the gold and faulty memory
allocations is safe and meaningful.
5.2.3 Weak Scaling Performance
Instrumenting code to track propagation at the both the micro and macro-level causes an increase in the
number of dynamic instructions — i.e. duplicating the static instructions and the instrumentation calls.
Chapter 3 tracks corruption propagation in three applications: Jacobi, CoMD, and HPCCG. In the exper-
iments, a fixed number of processes are used in the parallel executions. Figure 5.5 shows the overhead of
instrumentation compared to an unmodified execution. Actual runtimes are shown in Figure 5.6. Each
process of Jacobi has 4096 local grid points, CoMD has 2000 atoms, HPCCG has a local problem size of
nx = ny = nz = 13. For HPCCG and Jacobi, as the process count scales the overhead of instrument
decreases; however, for CoMD the overhead is more constant averaging 75× for all process sizes.
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Figure 5.5: Overhead of weak scaling applications instrumented to track corruption propagation.
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5.3 Conclusion
This chapter presents the design of SDCProp, the corruption tracking tool used in Chapter 3. This tool
tracks propagation at two levels micro (instruction level) and macro (application variable level). In addition,
the scalability and overhead of the tool is explored. The next chapter, Chapter 6, investigates how lossy
compression can be effectively used to in HPC checkpoint-restart.
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Figure 5.6: Weak scaling of applications with and without instrumentation for corruption propagation
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Chapter 6
Lossy Compression
Portions of this chapter are taken from the publication “Exploring the Feasibility of Lossy Compresion for
PDE Simulations” [17]
6.1 Introduction
High-performance computing (HPC) applications rely on checkpoint restart to extend execution time beyond
the requested allocation time and to tolerate failures in software and in hardware during the simulation run.
While the performance and memory of HPC systems continue to increase in size, one potential bottleneck in
continued use of checkpoint restart is that file system bandwidth has exhibited only slow growth in current
machines. For example, the current 10 petaflop machines Blue Waters at the University of Illinois and Titan
at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and the upcoming 100 petaflop machines Aurora1 at Argonne National
Laboratory and Summit2 at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, all incorporate 1 TB/s file systems. Since the
memory capacity in the 100 petaflop systems are approximately 5–9 times larger than in current 10 petaflop
systems, scalable applications are expected to see an increase in checkpoint restart times with a similar factor.
However, as HPC systems continue to increase in size and complexity, new design constraints [13, 96] such
as the high cost of data movement and comparatively free cost of computation allow for new optimizations.
Exascale systems are expected to put further pressure on the checkpoint system as the mean time between
failure (MTBF) is expected to decrease, thus demanding more frequent checkpointing [23]. This aspect has
motivated so-called multi-level checkpoint restart [79, 11] schemes, where the memory hierarchy is leveraged
to reduce the time to checkpoint and to recover when a failure occurs. The addition of burst buffers [69]
to HPC systems offers another approach to reduce time to checkpoint. Yet, multi-level checkpointing and
burst buffers do not target a reduction in checkpoint size, which is another major avenue for checkpoint time
reduction. Compression of the state variables can be used to reduce the checkpoint size. The relative cost of
compression decreases as computation becomes cheaper relative to the cost of data movement. For example,
1http://aurora.alcf.anl.gov/
2https://www.olcf.ornl.gov/summit/
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for processors on HPC systems, a single IEEE-754 fused multiply-add consumes three orders of magnitude
less power than a DRAM memory operation [90]. In addition, the cost of data movement increases as the
memory hierarchy is traversed from registers to file systems.
Standard compression techniques are often ill suited for floating-point data [99] which has prompted the
development of floating-point specific compressors. These are often lossless algorithms [68, 16] and, in most
cases, achieve around a 50% reduction in checkpoint size. By switching to lossy compression schemes [33,
60, 67], higher compression ratios can be achieved. Previous works [80, 92, 61] have shown success in
restarting from a lossy checkpoint, but have not focused on the relationship between the compression error
and the truncation error of the numerical approximations used in the simulation. Establishing this relation
is fundamental to guaranteeing correctness for users of numerical simulations.
Various break-even points for system and application level checkpointing have been analyzed for lossless
compressors on HPC machines [50]. For lossy compression, the performance benefits are realized if the overall
checkpoint time is reduced. Thus, the time to compress plays a key role in analysis. Lossy compression often
exhibits improved compression and decompression times in comparison to lossless schemes [60, 33].
This chapter investigates the feasibility of using lossy compression for checkpointing PDE simulations, by
interpreting the error introduced through lossy compression as numerical error and by relating it to spatial
discretization error and approximation properties in the numerical methods used in simulation. The chapter
highlights two important PDE model problems (advection and diffusion) and two production level HPC
applications (PlasComCM3 and Nek50004) that the error introduced by lossy compression at restart does
not increase beyond the discretization error, even in the scenario of multiple restarts in the same execution.
This underscores the idea that the compression error exhibits little influence on the quality of the final result
of the simulation.
Specifically, the contributions are
• expression of lossy compression error as numerical error;
• the relationship between error due to lossy compression with physical properties in the problem;
• a discussion of boundary conditions and the attenuation of compression error;
• the feasibility of lossy compression for checkpoint-restart on kernels and real applications; and
• a performance model that distinguishes the trade-off between efficiency and accuracy in lossy compres-
sion.
3http://xpacc.illinois.edu/
4https://nek5000.mcs.anl.gov/
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The rest of this chapter is outlined as follows. Section 6.2 discusses background in the area of compression
and HPC checkpoint restart. Section 6.3 outlines the relationship between error introduced through lossy
compression and the approximation properties of the discretization. Section 6.4 uses approximation bounds
to investigate propagation and reduction of error through several model PDE problems. Section 6.5 gives an
overview of two production level applications, PlasComCM and Nek5000, and presents results from using a
compression tolerance that is consistent with the numerical properties of the simulation. Section 6.6 uses a
performance model to explore efficiency of lossy compression.
6.2 Background
A critical element of lossy compression is the level of lossy compression — i.e., compression factor (factor
by which the data set size is reduced). Compression factors are dependant on the magnitude of error that
the compressor introduces. High compression factors leads to larger errors, but the magnitude of acceptable
compression error is problem dependent. A natural approach to determine the acceptability of a compression
error is to compare the lossy state with that of an uncompressed checkpoint and verify it passes simulation
validation metrics. This trial and error method can be effective, however a more direct route is to measure
the compression in comparison to the approximation properties in the application. This chapter explores
the applicability of lossy checkpointing from the numerical perspective and provides guidance on the setting
of the lossy checkpointing compression error tolerance.
Control of compression error is an important trait of a compressor. Indeed, only a strict control of the
compression error allows for the association between lossy compression and the properties of the numerical
methods. Lossy compressors for floating point data sets, such as ISABELA [60], NUMARCK [26], ZFP [67],
FPZIP [68], SZ [33], allow for varying degrees of control. In this work, SZ is used since the compressor
adheres to preset relative and absolute bounds on the tolerance on a per element basis and provides the
highest compression factors. In particular, SZ-1.3 is used, although other compressors fit within the scope
of this work.
6.3 Linking Compression Error to Numerical Error
This section describes the lossy compressor SZ [33] that is used for all experiments. In addition, it introduces
our methodology of selecting lossy compression error tolerances based on numerical truncation error.
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6.3.1 Lossy Compressor SZ
To use SZ, the user sets the error bound by selecting the tolerance, . It is chosen so that the difference
between the original value and decompressed value is bounded relatively and/or absolutely by .
SZ compresses data by predicting value i + 1 from values at i, i − 1, and i − 2 using curve fitting. If
the value predicted is within the prescribed tolerance, then the curve fitting function predicting i + 1 is
encoded as a codeword. If the value at i + 1 is inaccurate using a curve fitting, then an escaped codeword
is encoded. The value of i + 1 is then added to a list of other hard-to-compress data values. This list
is compressed by inspecting the binary representations of the data for commonality. SZ has compression
routines for single and double precision arrays. This chapter uses the double precision compression routines
during all experiments.
6.3.2 Method
Selecting the correct level of lossy compression is often based on trial and error. The quality of a decompressed
checkpoint is ultimately application dependent and assessing the quality requires deep knowledge of the
underlying physics. To this end, a priori bounds on the numerical discretization scheme are useful in
quantifying error in specific variables of the simulation. In addition, numerical stability of the numerical
method plays an important role.
This chapter exploits the fact that many HPC applications approximate the solution to PDEs or ODEs.
The level of accuracy given by the truncation error gives us an upper bound on compression error tolerances.
A compression tolerance less than the truncation error produces results that are within a factor of the
discretization error, but not bit-reproducible to the uncompressed solution. A compression tolerance greater
than truncation error will add more error into the state variables, potentially impacting simulation results.
To understand truncation error consider an approximation of u(x + h) by Taylor Series expansion, a
method used in deriving and analyzing numerical methods to solve PDEs and ODEs:
u(x+ h) = u(x) + u′(x)h+
u′′(x)h2
2
+O(h3) (6.1)
This Taylor Series truncates u(x+ h) to second order accuracy. Therefore, any error that is less than O(h2)
results in a numerically equivalent approximation to u(x + h) according to the accuracy specified when
truncating the Taylor Series.
The approach used in this chapter is to select a level of lossy compression that results in an error that
is less than the spatial discretization error of the problem. Given a spatial mesh size, hx in 1D, the order of
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accuracy of the method is specified as O(hpx), where p is the order of discretization accuracy. A simulation
that uses a second-order discretization with hx = 0.1, suggests an error of approximately e ≈ ch2x = c·0.01, for
some constant c. This implies that a numerical approximation, uh, and a perturbed numerical approximation
u˜h = uh+ are close if  < O(h2x). This motivates the approach taken in this chapter, where the compression
tolerance  is selected such that it is less than the simulation’s truncation error eh. For problems that use
adaptive mesh refinement, the compression tolerance is selected dynamically just before the application is
checkpointed based on the current finest grid resolution, and is the study of future work.
Figure 6.1, details the selection of lossy compression error tolerances. The numerical accuracy and spatial
discretization size are used to calculate a bound on the error and to produce a compatible compression error
tolerance. Optionally, the error tolerance can be further refined by leveraging application-specific knowledge
about the problem such as convergence properties, physical domain, and boundary conditions. After restart
from a lossy compressed checkpoint, results will not be bit-reproducible to those from the standard approach,
but are within the simulation’s numerical accuracy.
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Figure 6.1: Overview of method to select the lossy compression error tolerance.
Our method can also be used to guide the selection of tolerances to allow more error in return for higher
compression factors. For example, if  is the compression tolerance for a fourth-order accurate method, it
is straightforward to identify a compression tolerance for a second-order method. This new tolerance allows
for higher compression factors, but larger errors in the data. This new tolerance is interpreted as a low-
order approximation. In fact, similar approaches are used in HPC applications such as Nek5000 to reduce
checkpoint size. On restart, Nek5000 bootstraps itself with a low-order method, requiring data from fewer
time-steps until it is possible to use a high-order method.
Algorithm 6.1, outlines a generic time-stepping code that utilizes lossy compression during checkpoint
restart. The user computes an a priori bound on the simulation’s truncation error eh by using the smallest
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spatial mesh size and the numerical method’s order of accuracy as outlined above. Next the user selects a
compression error tolerance, , less than the truncation error, eh. The simulation starts and runs as normal
until a checkpoint is taken. The state variables u, p, and ρ represent the physical properties velocity, pressure,
and density, respectively. These physical properties are fundamental to computational fluid dynamics codes
such as PlasComCM and Nek5000. As the simulation progresses the state variables u, p, and ρ are lossy
compressed before the checkpoint is written. After the checkpoint is established, computation proceeds as
normal until the final time-step. If the simulation requires a restart before reaching the final time-step,
then the lossy checkpoint is read and computation proceeds using the decompressed versions of the state
variables.
Algorithm 6.1: Outline of generic time-stepping code that using lossy compressed checkpoints.
Input: eh: User estimate of truncation error.
: User selected compression error tolerance less than eh.
checkpoint interval: Number of iterations between checkpoints.
1 Function main()
2 if restarting == FALSE then
3 u← initVelocity()
4 p← initPressure()
5 ρ← initDensity()
6 else
7 u← readDecompressVelocity()
8 p← readDecompressPressure()
9 ρ← readDecompressDensity()
10 for t← 0 to T do
11 u← updateVelocity()
12 p← updatePressure()
13 ρ← updateDensity()
14 if t mod checkpoint interval then
15 lossyCompressCheckpoint(u, p, ρ, )
6.4 Understanding Compression Error Behavior on 1D Model
Problems
To motivate the approach outlined in Section 6.3, two model PDEs are presented: 1D heat and 1D
advection equations. These two model PDEs are selected to highlight the impact of physical properties on
the selection of lossy compression error tolerances. The behavior of these model problems are reflected in
more complex HPC applications, as observed in Section 6.5.
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6.4.1 1D Heat
The 1D heat equation finds the temperature solution u(x, t) for all positions x and time t along a rod with
fixed length L is given by
ut = uxx + q(x), 0 < x < 1, (6.2)
u(0, t) = 20, u(L, t) = 50, t > 0 (6.3)
u(x, 0) = f(x), 0 < x < L, (6.4)
where q(x) is a time independent external heat source forcing term along the length of the rod. For this
example, Backward Euler with second-order finite differences is used to discretize (6.2) yielding
un+1j − unj
ht
− u
n+1
j+1 − 2un+1j + un+1j−1
h2x
= q(x). (6.5)
This results in a tri-diagonal linear system that is solved using a direct method at each time-step to simulate
the PDE. The numerical accuracy of (6.5) is O(ht;h2x), first-order accurate in time and second-order accurate
in space. Thus, errors in the solution that are much smaller than O(ht;h2x) will not impact the overall
accuracy of the numerical approximation. Since restarting from a lossy compressed checkpoint adds an error
into the simulation, this lossy compression error tolerance is selected so that the error is below the truncation
error of the numerical scheme. For this problem, hx = 0.02 implies an accuracy of e
h = 0.022 = 4e−4 and
a compression tolerance of  = 1e−4. Figure 6.2 shows error in the solution of (6.5) with and external heat
source:
q(x) =
 100 : x = L/20 : x 6= L/2
Figure 6.2 shows the error e = uh − u˜h in restarting the simulation at time t = 0.6 and t = 1.1 from
lossy compressed checkpoints at the preceding time steps of t = 0.5 and t = 1.0, respectively. Each tick
on the y-axis section represents a single time-step in the simulation. The state of the second restart is
affected by two lossy compressed checkpoints. A blank (white) region in the figure denotes no error in the
compressed numerical solution, u˜h, compared to an uncompressed numerical solution uh. After restart,
Figure 6.2 shows that error is distributed throughout the entire domain and is attenuated after a few time-
steps. This is expected as this PDE models heat conduction, resulting in smooth solutions and propagation
of error through the domain as time advances. In addition, with the selection of a constant temperature
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Figure 6.2: Error at each grid-point in a 1D heat equation between numerical solution, uh, and a numerical
solution restarted from lossy checkpoints, u˜h, at time t = 0.6, 1.1.
boundary conditions the solution will converge to a steady-state solution. This property further accelerates
the aforementioned removal of error in the heat equation.
Figure 6.3, underscores the limited impact of lossy compression at a tolerance of  = 1e−4, which does
not contribute to error above the truncation error of eh = 4e−4. Thus, the numerical solution that depends
on two restarts from lossy compressed checkpoints, u˜h, is equivalent to the original numerical solution, uh.
Although the solution is compressed to a tolerance  = 1e−4, the resulting error in u˜h is small due to the
smoothness of the solution between any two consecutive points in the domain being easily predicted by the
lossy compressor.
6.4.2 1D Advection
A notable aspect of (6.2) is the attenuation of error as time evolves. The advection equation (6.6), does not
have such a property. Instead, solutions (and error) propagate following a characteristic in the direction of
flow. Any corruption in the solution remains in the wave until the boundary of the domain. In contrast,
application of periodic boundaries does not allow error to escape the domain. As a result, error can accumu-
late with each restart from a lossy compressed checkpoint. To illustrate this point, consider a 1D advection
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Figure 6.3: Maximum absolute error in the compressed numerical solution, u˜h due to restarting from a lossy
compressed checkpoint for the 1D heat equation (6.2).
equation with periodic boundaries:
ut = −ux, 0 < x < 2pi
u(0, t) = u(L, t), t > 0
u(x, 0) = f(x), 0 < x < L
(6.6)
The equations in (6.6) are solved using Lax-Wendroff, which has a spatial truncation error of O(h2x), and
with an initial condition of u(x, 0) = f(x) = sin(3x). In this example, the lossy compression error tolerance is
set at  = 1e−5 since the spatial discretization of hx = 0.006 suggests accuracy up to 0.0062 = 3.6e−5 = eh.
The restarts are employed at times t = 1.25, 2.5, and 3.75. In Figure 6.4, the error history shows that
with each successive restart, the error persists (error lines do not reduce in magnitude between checkpoints),
increases (error lines become darker with the number of checkpoints), and is propagated though the domain
in the direction of advection (error at each point shifts to the right as time increases). If periodic boundary
conditions are not used, then error still exist between the two solutions due to the restart, but only until
the component of the error leaves the domain.
Periodic boundary conditions allow for the accumulation of error shown in Figure 6.5. Figure 6.5, shows
that the maximum error in the compressed numerical solution u˜h at each time-step is always less than
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truncation error for this simulation, even when restarting multiple times. The compression error tolerance is
chosen to guarantee this by staying below the truncation error of the method. This is done heuristically in
a small training run by observing the max-norm over the first few time-steps after restarting and selecting
a tolerance, , that yields a max-norm roughly an order of magnitude less than the truncation error, eh, to
allow for unforeseen accumulation. This can be repeated in quick secession to gauge the impact of multiple
restarts.
Figure 6.4: Error at each grid-point in a 1D advection equation between a normal numerical solution, uh,
and a numerical solution restarted from lossy checkpoints, u˜h, at times t = 1.25, 2.5, and 3.75.
6.5 Lossy Compressing Production Applications
This section applies the approach of selecting lossy compression error tolerances from Section 6.3 to two
production level HPC applications: PlasComCM and Nek5000. Results are collected on Blue Waters, a
Cray machine managed by the National Center for Supercomputing Applications. This chapter uses the
XE6 nodes on the machine, which are equipped with 64GB of memory and two AMD Interlagos CPUs per
node. The checkpointing routines of PlasComCM and Nek5000 are modified to lossy compress all state
variables just before they are written to disk. Each state variable is compressed with SZ-1.3 [33] using
relative and absolute error bounds. In production runs of both applications, checkpoints are taken every
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Figure 6.5: Maximum absolute error in a compressed numerical solution, u˜h due to restarting from lossy
compressed checkpoints for the 1D advection equation (6.6). Restarts from a lossy checkpoint occur at times
t = 1.25, 2.5, and 3.75.
1,000–3,000 time-steps which equates to around 1–10% of simulation time for the data sets used during
testing. Simulations with higher execution times exhibit a larger portion of time spent in checkpointing.
6.5.1 PlasComCM
The first example uses PlasComCM5, a multi-physics plasma combustion code. The core functionality of
the code targets the incompressible Navier-Stokes equations. Production runs checkpoint 1MB – 1GB per
process. Here, the 2D homogeneous Euler equations are used as a model problem. Inside the domain,
there is a fixed cylinder object obstructing the flow (see Figure 6.7). An overset mesh, Figure 6.6, is placed
around the cylinder (white circle inside mesh) to help resolve the obstructed flow. This problem is run
with 4 processes each checkpointing about 1MB per process. The momentum solution of this problem after
evolving for 60,020 time-steps is shown in Figure 6.7.
The checkpoint file in PlasComCM consists of four state variables: density, x-momenta, y-momenta, and
energy. Figure 6.8 shows a large difference in the compression factor depending on the selected compression
error tolerance ranging from 104× for  = 1e−1 to 2.2× for  = 1e−10. Compression factors for small error
tolerances are consistent with reported lossless compression factors [99]. As the compression error tolerances
5https://bitbucket.org/xpacc-dev/plascomcm
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Figure 6.6: Overset mesh in PlasComCM adds a curvilinear mesh around cylindrical object (white circle).
decrease there is a corresponding increase in compression time as shown in Figure 6.9.
The 2D flow problem is solved using fourth-order Runge-Kutta with hx = 0.065 and hy = 0.065. Applying
the approach from Section 6.3, accuracy up to eh = 1.8e−5 is assumed in both x and y. Thus, a compression
error tolerance of  < 1.8e−5 is required such that error added due to compression into this does not impact
simulation results. The tolerance  = 1e−6 is selected to allow for accumulation of error due to multiple
restarts. This tolerance yields an average compression factor of 7×.
To study the propagation of error in the simulation, 75,000 time-steps are used to reach a fully developed
flow. To simulate either a fail-stop failure or exceeding a time allocation at time-step 15,000, 30,000,
and 45,000, the simulation restarts from a lossy compressed checkpoint. Figure 6.11 plots the max-norm
between the numerical solution uh and the compressed numerical solution u˜h. With each checkpoint there is
an increase in error in the system, but the error from lossy compression and advancing the simulation from
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Figure 6.7: Momentum magnitude after 60,020 time-steps for PlasComCM. The fixed cylinder object (white
circle) obstructs the flow causing momentum to slow around the object in the direction of flow (to the right).
lossy state is always less than truncation error.
Between the first and second restart (time-steps 15,000–30,000), there is a reduction in the error of all
state variables. This is due to the selection of non-periodic boundary conditions, which allow the error to flow
out of the domain. However, between the second and third restart (time-steps 30,000–45,000) the magnitude
of error increases due to concentration of error in regions of the domain with low momentum — i.e., to the left
of the cylindrical object. After the third restart, the simulation evolves another 30,000 time-steps in order
to allow the error to accumulate. Over these time-steps the error remains near the compression tolerance of
 = 1e−6, and there is a slow reduction as error moves from regions of low momentum to regions of higher
momentum before exiting the domain.
The restart frequency used in this problem corresponds to a system MTBF of approximately 18 minutes.
This MTBF is a much lower in comparison to current systems and expected exascale systems, but does
highlight the nature of error propagation/accumulation for this problem. If the frequency of restarting from
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Figure 6.8: Compression factors for PlasComCM.
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Figure 6.9: Compression time for PlasComCM.
lossy checkpoints is high, then error accumulation above the level of truncation error can occur. In this case,
a smaller compression tolerance  should be used minimizing the risk of exceeding the level of truncation
error.
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(a) Time-step 15000: Distribution of
compression error due to lossy restart.
Overset grid is visible in error.
(b) Time-step 23000: Error propagates
though domain in direction of flow (to
the right).
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Figure 6.10: Propagation of momentum error in PlasComCM.
Visualizing the error, Figure 6.10, in the simulation highlights two key properties about this problem’s
handling of error. First, the domain has non-periodic boundary conditions. This allows flow that is slightly
perturbed to leave the simulation as time evolves reducing the amount of error. Any error that accumulates
above or below the cylindrical object is removed from the domain as its path out of the domain is unob-
structed. Second, in the same momentum error plots, Figure 6.10, a large spike in error is observed near
the leftmost part of the fixed cylindrical object. Accumulation of error at this point is due to the near-zero
momentum (cf. Figure 6.7). With almost no momentum to move this error though the domain, it becomes
concentrated and slowly increases in magnitude as time evolves. These domain specific properties of error
propagation suggests that lossy compression routines can improve by adjusting compression error tolerances
to the physical properties of the domain that can accumulate or propagate error.
6.5.2 Nek5000
Nek50006 is a spectral element code developed at Argonne National Laboratory designed to simulate a variety
of problem types such as heat transfer, unsteady incompressible Navier-Stokes flow, and incompressible
magnetohydrodynamics. Production runs checkpoint 0.1MB – 2MB per process.
The test problem considered in this example is a 3D Navier-Stokes simulation of a channel flow with
periodic boundary conditions. Figure 6.12 shows the solution of velocity at 30,000 time-steps. The simulation
restarts twice during execution at time-step 1,500 and time-step 11,500 (MTBF of 50 min.). This test problem
is run with 16 processes each checkpointing about 1 MB of data.
Compression factors for Nek5000, shown in Figure 6.13, are as high as 280× for the x-component of
6https://github.com/Nek5000/Nek5000
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Figure 6.11: Max-norm between numerical solution uh and compressed numerical solution u˜h for Plas-
ComCM.
Figure 6.12: Magnitude of velocity after 30,000 time-steps for Nek5000.
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velocity with compression tolerance  = 1e−1. As the compression error tolerance decreases, compression
factors approach 2× for all variables. The discrepancy in compression factors between the x-component of
velocity and the other variables is due to the ability of SZ to more accurately predict the values. SZ adopts
curve-fitting to predict future values in the array. If a section of data is easily represented with a curve-fitting
predictor, then compression factors are high. If the data is not easily predicted by curve-fitting, SZ utilizes
binary analysis on the hard to compress regions. However, binary analysis is less effective at reducing data
size in comparison to curve-fitting. This also suggests that compressors more directly designed for physical
properties may yield improved compression factors.
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Figure 6.13: Smaller compression tolerances lead to higher compression factors for Nek5000.
Compression time of the Nek5000 state variables, shown in Figure 6.14, fall within two regimes that
mirror the compression factor results. Variables that are easier to compress and exhibit large compression
factors take less time than difficult-to-compress variables. Furthermore, selection of the lossy compressor
can greatly influence the time to compress and compression factor. This highlights a need for further study
into development of specialized compressors that are tailored to certain state variables in PDEs.
The 3D channel flow problem solves two linear systems at each time-step: one for pressure and one for
velocity. The linear systems for pressure and velocity are solved using GMRES to a tolerance of eh = 1e−5.
The accuracy of the linear system solve suggests compression tolerances  < 1e−5 are required, due to
periodic boundary conditions that do not permit error to escape the domain the compression tolerance is
94
1e
-1
0
1e
-0
9
1e
-0
8
1e
-0
7
1e
-0
6
1e
-0
5
1e
-4
1e
-3
1e
-2
1e
-1
Compression Error Tolerance
0.0000
0.0002
0.0004
0.0006
0.0008
0.0010
Ti
m
e 
(se
c)
x-velocity
y-velocity
z-velocity
pressure
Figure 6.14: Time to compress for Nek5000 increases as the error tolerance decreases. Easy to compress
data compresses faster, Figure 6.13.
set at  = 1e−7, allowing for an increase in error due to multiple restarts.
Figure 6.15, shows the maximum error in the pressure along with the directional components of velocity
between the numerical solution uh and a compressed numerical solution u˜h. After restarting from a lossy
checkpoint, there is an initial spike in error in the time-steps immediately following the restart, but it
remains below discretization error. As time evolves, the error reduces as it migrates though the domain and
approaches a steady state (due to boundary conditions). After the second restart, at time-step 11,500, there
is another spike in error due to restarting from lossy state. As time evolves the error propagates though the
domain, but remains less than discretization error.
Figure 6.16 shows the spatial location of error for the velocity solution in Figure 6.12 at time-step 30,000.
Regions of large error correspond to regions of high velocity. The initial distribution of error after a lossy
restart, Figure 6.16a, illustrates processor boundaries and data distribution. Even though ghost regions on
other processors are needed to advance the simulation, SZ’s compression algorithm only considers local data
when compressing. This results in faster compression times, but results in compression artifacts around
processor boundaries. Compression artifacts are magnified when the per process distribution of data is not
spatially contiguous. Values that appear to be neighbors locally due to how data is stored may in fact be
distant globally leading to compression artifacts and lower compression rates.
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Figure 6.15: Max-norm between numerical solution uh and compressed numerical solution u˜h for pressure
and velocity for Nek5000. There is no error before time-step 1,500 as the simulation is not yet restarted.
(a) Time-step 1,500: Distribution of compression error due to
lossy restart. Processor boundaries are visible.
(b) Time-step 30,000: Error in velocity magnitude for Nek5000
from Figure 6.12.
Figure 6.16: Propagation of velocity error in Nek5000.
6.6 Modeling Time to Checkpoint
The previous sections show that leveraging the truncation error of HPC applications is an effective method of
selecting a lossy compression error tolerance when compressing checkpoint files. Ultimately, however, lossy
compression is only used for checkpointing if it results in a more efficient checkpoint. To explore several
trade-offs for lossy compression, the time to checkpoint is modeled on a machine similar to Blue Waters. A
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simple model for time to checkpoint, T , is given by
T = cb · V + wb · V
f
, (6.7)
where cb is the bandwidth of the compressor, V is the number of bytes being written per process, wb is
the file system bandwidth, and f is the compression factor of the compressor. For the case without lossy
compression, cb = 0 and f = 1. For lossy compression to be useful, the time to checkpoint using lossy
compression, Tlossy, needs to be less than the time to checkpoint without compression, Treg: Tlossy < Treg.
This simplifies to
f >
wb
wb − cb , (6.8)
which is used to estimate the minimum compression factor for lossy compression to be viable. This model
does not take into consideration the complex nature of the parallel I/O system. Despite this limitation
however, the model is useful to estimate when compression improves performance. A more refined I/O
model [52] that considered the parallel data exchanges in collective I/O reads/writes is parametrized for
Blue Waters.
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Figure 6.17: Fastest I/O configuration with various file system and compression bandwidths.
Figure 6.17 explores a combination of compression bandwidths and file system bandwidth to see if using
lossy compression can improve time to checkpoint for a parallel job consisting of 2048 processes on 128
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nodes. Each process checkpoints 16 MB of data. From Figure 6.17, lossy compression becomes increasingly
attractive as compression bandwidth increases relative to I/O bandwidth. Practice shows effective I/O
bandwidth is much less than peak [73], while compression can reach memory bandwidth. For example, a
PlasComCM runs of this size achieves an average aggergate file system bandwidth of around 2 GB/s on
Blue Waters. A compression bandwidth of 64 MB/s is enough to improve the time to checkpoint. The
measured compression bandwidth for PlasComCM7 is 78 MB/s. For PlasComCM, lossy compression can
improve checkpointing time by 1.8× compared to standard checkpointing. Using Amdahl’s law with an I/O
fraction of 10%, the improvement in overall execution time is 4.7%. Because many HPC applications achieve
a low I/O bandwidth, even modest compression bandwidths make lossy compression an attractive approach
to improve the time to checkpoint.
6.7 Discussion
The previous sections explore the feasibility of setting lossy compressor error tolerances based on the nu-
merical accuracy of the simulation. Results show that a compression error relative to the numerical error
results in minimal impact on the simulation. Yet, there are several directions of development that would
improve lossy checkpointing and increase its utility in practice.
Error Accumualtion: Error propagation after a restart and the frequency of restarts complicate the pro-
cess of selecting a compression tolerance. Further analysis on the propagation of error due to lossy
compression and quantifying the compression error is needed. In addition, the impact of multiple
restarts should be explored.
Physics Based Compression: Simulations often rely on the conservation of key quantities — e.g. mass,
energy — require symmetries in the domain, or compute statistics on state variables. Development of
compressors that are designed specifically for certain physical properties could ensure key properties
are satisfied.
Adaptive Compression: This chapter uses one global compression error tolerance for all checkpoints and
variables. Using different tolerances spatially and temporally for all state variables will allow new
optimizations that reduce checkpoint size and mitigate the effect of error accumulation.
Lower Precision Computation: This work considers computation on double precision data. If computa-
tion is performed on lower precision, single or half precision, lossy compression can still be employed,
7Data compressed to  = 1e−6 with a single threaded unoptimized SZ-1.3 using relative and absolute error bounds.
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but requires more from the lossy compressor in terms of compression factor and/or compression time.
Using single or half precision reduces the data set size by 2× or 4× compared to double precision. For
lossy compressors to reduce data set size in these scenarios, it will need to achieve compression factors
larger than 2× or 4× on the double precision data.
6.8 Conclusion
This chapter investigates how to use numerical truncation error to set the compression error tolerance of
lossy compression schemes used during checking. The effectiveness of this approach is shown on two 1D
model problems and two production level applications. Modeling checkpointing time highlights system and
application properties where lossy compression improves the time to checkpoint. The next chapter presents
prior research that is related to the Chapters 2–6 and topics in this dissertation.
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Chapter 7
Related Work
7.1 Resilience in Algebraic Multigrid
The resiliency of AMG to SDC has been studied previously [78], where checksums are used to detect SDCs.
The approach is limited to dense matrices, but is robust, incorporating checks for matrix-vector multiplica-
tions, relaxation, and interpolation.
More recent work [25] reports that AMG is resilient to SDC due to its iterative and multi-level nature.
Provided that AMG does not experience a segmentation fault, a SDC with high probability emerges as an
error in the solution vector. This error is subsequently removed at the cost of more work. Moreover, the
error is reduced on a coarser level, where the error is more pronounced. The recovery scheme addresses a
segmentation faults by applying triple modular redundancy (TMR) [74] to key pointers and ranks the three
instances when accessed, accepting the pointer with the most credibility. This is used in each access to the
protected arrays, therefore yielding resiliency at a large overhead. Regardless, the approach decreases the
number of segmentation faults for AMG in a faulty environment; on the other hand the resiliency overhead
is present even in the case when AMG is not exposed to faults. In contrast, the recovery scheme presented
in Chapter 2 induces less overhead, even when AMG does not suffer a segmentation fault. In addition, the
scheme provides checks that alert the AMG solver of the presence of SDC and attempts to avoid the impact
of the fault instead of allowing AMG to remove the error through more iterations or a full restart.
Recent works have analyzed the multigrid algorithm and have concluded that it is not fully fault re-
silient [3, 2]. To protect the solver, they establish theoretically and experimentally that a protected Prolon-
gation operator yields a more robust method. Other work uses a fail-stop fault model [49] to explore forward
and backward recovery strategies.
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7.2 Error Propagation
Redundancy: Redundancy is a common tool in detection schemes. Triple modular redundancy (TMR) [74]
ensures correctness by computing values through triplicating computations and majority voting on results.
Redundant threads or processes have been used to detect transient and permanent errors in hardware and
software [39, 82]. Redundancy at these levels often yield high overheads, but also high protection from soft
errors. The GangES error simulator [93] seeks to limit the time required for fault injection experiments on
applications running on micro-architectural simulators by checking for similarities in application state to
prior fault injection runs. GangES does not consider parallel applications.
Tools: Static analysis modeling corruption propagation combined with fault injection experiments is
extensively used in compiler based protection schemes to identify key instructions to protect. IPAS [59]
leverages machine learning on fault injection experiments to learn which instructions are good candidates
for replication to prevent program output corruption. However, this approach can be limited by a dependence
on training. Compiler analysis with profiling [56] can be used to improve the effectiveness of an instruction
replication scheme; however the long term impact of corruption is not considered, such as between processes.
SDCTune [72] uses static analysis, heuristics, and fault injection data to construct a probability model for
corruption to decide what instructions are likely to generate SDC. Extensions of the Program Vulnerability
Factor [37] metric have been used to distinguish between crashes and SDC, thus allowing for more accurate
estimates of SDC and crash rates. The modeling of corruption propagation is again limited to sequential
programs. CrashFinder [64] explores the effectiveness of combining compiler analysis and fault injection
results to identify instructions that generate long latency crashes due to pointer, loop, and state corruption;
the propagation of corruption is not investigated. SymPLFIED [85] uses symbolic execution to abstract
the state of corrupted values in the program to find hard-to-detect fault injection locations that random
fault-injection may not target; their work is limited to sequential integer programs.
Characterization: A study of the numerical impact of a single bit-flip on matrix-vector computations
and GMRES is presented in [36, 35], respectively. An analysis of long latency crashes [104], shows corruptions
in memory have long fault activation times leading to long latencies for crashes compared to corruption in
registers, but does not investigate the extent of corruption propagation at the time of detection and the
ability to recover locally. The impact of soft errors on the Linux kernel is studied [40], but the corruption of
system state variables to determine how to prevent propagation for long latency crashes is not quantified.
Y-branches [103] explores how control flow divergence impacts application correctness and performance.
Control flow re-converges if the architectural state exactly matches a golden copy; however, for applications
that can remove or mask corruption over-time, this may underestimate the number Y-branches.
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Characterizations of corruption in floating-point computation inside HPC applications is presented in [4].
Corruption is tracked based on terms of number of incorrect memory accesses and does not relate this to
application level variables. A similar study [65], quantifies corruption in GPU and host memories for GPU
benchmarks, but does not look at how corruption propagation in a distributed memory environment.
Recovery: Establishing a bound on the subset of total program state that is corrupted allows for
localized recovery. Containment domains [29] surround code regions, using verification to ensure correctness.
Identifying the location of code containment remains open. Similarly, transactional semantics [47] has been
used for MPI state, but not on application variables that may be corrupted. Esoftcheck [106], uses compiler
analysis to remove redundant SDC detectors to maintain high reliability, but does not consider the latency
of detection and how it effects propagation. An analytic version of this problem which investigates optimal
placement of detectors of different capabilities to verify a checkpoint is corruption free is presented in [8],
but considers a fixed recovery time that does not change based on the level of state corruption.
7.3 Fault Injection
Many fault injectors have been created that operate in real time and on real hardware. DOCTOR [44]
injects faults into memory, the CPU, and network communications by using time-outs and traps to overwrite
memory locations and modify the binary. XCEPTION [24] is an exception handler that injects faults when
triggered by accesses to specific memory addresses, and simulates stuck-at-zero, stuck-at-one, and bit-flips.
NFTAPE [102] uses a driver based fault injection scheme to inject fault inside the user or kernel space, but
requires OS modification.
In compiler based fault injection, hard errors are simulated by adding extra instructions that always
inject in the same location. To address the static nature of these injections, the injections are made dynamic
by addition of code that corrupts data at runtime based on programmatic and environmental factors.
Fault injection for MPI applications is often focused on message injection [39]. Yet other works consider
soft errors that manifest in register modifications [25] or that arise in the memory image of the running
application [70, 63]. The approach in [63] allows user identification of stack and heap items to target for
injection. This is similar to the approach presented in Chapter 4, and allows the user to select functions
that are faulty.
P-FSEFI [41] runs parallel applications insider a virtual machine (VM). The hypervisor has control over
all code and memory executed by the application, and can create extensive fault injection campaigns in all
layers of the software stack. However, not all HPC systems allow deployment of VMs.
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Relax [31] and LLFI [71], are LLVM based fault injectors similar to FlipIt; however, Relax is not publicly
available and is designed from an old version of LLVM, and LLFI was released after development of FlipIt
was underway. Regardless, both injectors do not target HPC applications.
KULFI [97] is a publicly available fault injector similar to Relax and LLFI. Because KULFI was open
source at the time development started and is easily modifiable, its structure provides a basis for our fault
injector FlipIt. In particular, FlipIt utilizes the framework of their compiler pass, but FlipIt provides a fault
injector that is more expansive, extensible, and provides more user control than KULFI.
7.4 Lossy Compression
The applicability of lossy compression for data transfer to and from main memory has been studied for
several applications, including LULESH, pF3D, and Miranda [61], where simulation correctness is measured
by post-simulation analysis of the physics. In Chapter 6, we utilize the application’s spatial discretization
properties to construct a bound for the amount of error allowed in the simulation. The benefit is that the
accuracy of the associated numerical method is known a priori and compression error can be dominated by
the discretization truncation error. Another approach uses a two-stage scheme to compress: first lossy, then
lossless [80]. The checkpoint size is observed to be around 15% of the original size and restarts are shown
to be successful. Another observation is that errors introduced through a particular variable may result in
a large propagation of error, leading to the use of lossy compression on only a subset of the checkpointed
variables. Wavelet based lossy compression has been used in the climate application NICAM [92], where it
is shown that the relative error remains less than 1.5% 1500 time-steps after restart from a lossy compressed
checkpoint. One disadvantages is that the error continues to grow linearly with time.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
HPC systems have become instrumental to many fields of science and engineering. However, due to power
and budgetary constraints on future systems, the rates of soft errors that cause SDC in HPC applications is
expected to increase.
Analyzing how SDC impacts applications allows for creating of algorithmic based detection and recovery
schemes. Through the use of application specific detectors the algebraic multigrid (AMG) linear solver
is augmented, allowing it to detect SDC that significantly impact convergence. With SDC detected, the
proposed multi-level recovery scheme is able to recover and converge with a high probability even when a
high number of faults occur during the solve. Going forward, fault consideration is going to become a driving
factor in the design of long running and large-scale software. With the additions proposed in the dissertation,
AMG has shown it is capable of being used in faulty environments. Moreover, the residual check and the
local segmentation fault recovery scheme are general and likely to be valuable in other numerical libraries.
SDCProp, a tool that tracks SDC propagation at a load/store and application level data structure
granularity, is created and used to explore how state corruption due to a soft error propagates at a micro
(instruction level) and macro (application variable) level for three applications: Jacobi, HPCCG, and CoMD.
At a micro-level, latency of segmentation faults, divergence of control flow, and detection are investigated.
In addition, the impact of compiler optimizations is explored on two kernels: WAXPBY and SpMV. Results
show that the majority of segmentation faults occur shortly after a fault occurs allowing for little propagation.
Deviations in control flow predominantly occur as premature loop termination in loops where the fault occurs.
Detections have a large enough instruction latency to allow for inter-process propagation.
Macro-level results highlight the speed and intensity of corruption on the processes where the failure
occurs and between other processes. Corruption results for critical data structures are discussed along
with the ability to define regions of containment for local recovery. Finally, increasing the local problem
size increases the latency of inter-process corruption propagation in Jacobi, while it does not influence the
latency of CoMD and HPCCG.
Latencies are useful in determining the effectiveness of a detection scheme — i.e. short latencies limit
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corruption propagation and can lower recovery costs. However, low cost recovery in a parallel application
requires knowledge of the corrupted processes and data structures. Tracking propagation at the macro-level
enables discovery of the variables that are most susceptible to corruption. In addition, it identifies the speed
of corruption between processes, and indicates whether operations reduce or amplify corruption.
To help assess to the resiliency of HPC applications we create a fault injection framework, FlipIt, to
simulate soft errors inside HPC applications. Scalability of FlipIt is shown with weak scaling experiments
with HYPRE, HPCCG, and CoMD. FlipIt’s overhead diminishes as the application’s communication begins
to dominate computation. To support various application requirements, FlipIt is designed to be flexible
allowing for complex fault injection campaigns and locations. Using FlipIt’s features, we inject a fault into
HYPRE at a specific location and time to show that a soft error can significantly impact the convergence
time of AMG.
Checkpoint restart is an integral part of long running HPC applications. Yet, data movement is becoming
a key bottleneck on current and future machines. In response, lossy compression is a method to effectively
reduce the volume of data required for a checkpoint, but at the expense of adding error into the simulation.
The compression error tolerance is often difficult to determine a priori. Chapter 6 investigates the feasibility
of using numerical truncation error as a basis for selecting the lossy compression error tolerance. First, by
demonstrating this use on a 1D heat and 1D advection equation, it is shown that error introduced through
compression can have limited impact on the simulation. In addition, results for two production level HPC
applications PlacComCM and Nek5000 highlight its use. Results show that limiting lossy compression error
to that of the discretization error allows simulations to restart from a lossy compressed checkpoint without
significantly impacting the simulation. Finally, lossy compression is shown to reduce checkpoint time for
compression error bounds that respect the truncation error of the application.
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